

VIOLENT EXTREMISM IN NIGERIA



National Policy Framework on Demobilisation. Deradicalisation. Rehabilitation. Reintegration (D.D.R.R)

National Policy Framework ▶ Implementation Strategy ▶ Policy Brief

DDRR
DEMobilisation
DERADICALISATION
REHABILITATION &
REINTEGRATION

**THE
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[National Policy Framework](#) ▶ [Implementation Strategy](#) ▶ [Policy Brief](#)

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part one

NATIONAL
FRAMEWORK ON

**DEMOBILISATION,
DERADICALISATION,
REHABILITATION AND
REINTEGRATION**



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EXECUTIVE SUMMARY

Nigeria is a multi-religious and multi-ethnic country, which is in part shaped by a protracted three-year civil war and nearly thirty years of military dictatorship under seven military regimes between January 1966 and May 1999.¹ After more than fifty years of independence, Nigeria remains a country in transition, inundated by political violence and civil conflicts, unable to take advantage of the opportunities provided by its own political history to embrace a genuine transitional agenda and promote sustainable peace and development. Nigeria is plagued with perennial security challenges such as organised crime, violent extremism and ethno-religious violence that could have been easily prevented and resolved through a genuine process of reconciliation, political accountability and elimination of the culture of impunity.

The government has adopted military and non-military strategies against violent extremist groups such as Boko Haram in North-East Nigeria since 2009. Security forces have been massively deployed in Borno and Yobe since then. In 2011, the government officially established the Joint Task Force 'Operation Restore Order I' or ORO (I)² in Borno and deployed 'ORO III' in Yobe state. When the state of emergency was declared in these states in May 2013, ORO I was replaced by Operation BOYONA.³ Subsequently, the 7th Division of the Nigerian Army was established and mandated to take over Operation BOYONA and the entire

JTF command. This was renamed Operation Zaman Lafiya with 10,000 troops. This might be the largest military deployment since Nigeria's civil war. In 2012, the Nigerian government re-organized the Multi-national Joint Task Force (MNJTF) to include a counter-terrorism mandate. In addition, the civilian JTF was also organized in 2013 to help security forces identify Boko Haram members and gather intelligence.⁴

The non-military response to the Boko Haram insurgency began when former President Goodluck Jonathan established a 26-member amnesty committee to negotiate with Boko Haram.⁵ He also set up the Committee on Peaceful Resolution of the conflict headed by Tanimu Turaki, former Special Duties Minister to develop an amnesty framework for members of the Boko Haram sect.⁶ The successive government led by President Muhammadu Buhari also conducted informal negotiations that resulted in the release of the Chibok and Dapchi girls in May 7, 2017 and March 21, 2018 respectively.⁷

The government passed the Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (Amended 2013), which provides the Office of the National Security Adviser with the appropriate mandate. On March 18, 2014, the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) launched Nigeria's soft approach to countering terrorism. This approach was reviewed, and a new strategy called

¹ Hakeem O. Yusuf, 2007, *Calling the Judiciary to Account for the Past: Transitional Justice and Judicial Accountability in Nigeria*, http://www.works.bepress.com/hakeem_yusuf/7 (accessed 28 June, 2012).

² Amnesty International (AI), 2015. "Stars on their Soldiers, Blood on their Hands", (accessed 7 November, 2015) <https://www.amnesty.org/download/Documents/AFR4416572015ENGLISH.PDF>, p. 20.

³ Derived from the acronym of the three most impacted states: Borno, Yobe, and Adamawa

⁴ Chiluiwa Innocent, 2011. 'Media Representation of Nigeria's Joint Task Force in the Niger Delta Crisis.' *In International Journal of Humanities and Social Science* 1(9):197-208, p.199.

⁵ Thurston, Alex 2013. Amnesty for Boko Haram: Lessons from the past. *Africa Futures*, 20 May. Available from: <<http://forums.ssrc.org/african-futures/2013/05/20/amnesty-for-boko-haram-lessons-from-the-past/>> [Accessed 18 June 2013].

⁶ Author's Interview, Turaki Tanimu, former Minister Special Duties, Abuja, 13 December 2013. The minister confirmed President Jonathan's support for the negotiations.

⁷ BBC, 2017. The fate of Chibok Girls. www.bbc.co.uk/news/resources/idt-sh/chibok_girls

'Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism (PCVE)' was developed. The strategy was signed in August 2017 and launched in September 2017. The Nigerian Prison Service Deradicalisation Programme started in 2015 for the de-radicalisation and rehabilitation of alleged violent extremist offenders who are on trial, convicted, sentenced or awaiting trial. In April 2016, the army established Operation Safe Corridor for de-radicalising and rehabilitating repentant Boko Haram members.

These approaches are both military and humanitarian in nature. However, there is no strategy that directly addresses community fragmentation, reconciliation and forgiveness. The government established approaches do not consider the need for community engagement and consultation to understand their needs, challenges and perspectives on how these concerns can be harnessed for stability and peaceful transition. These approaches are also disjointed since they have been developed without a comprehensive framework on Demobilisation, Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of perpetrators, victims and affected communities that would be coordinated by a central body.

The National Framework on DDRR is designed to address these challenges. It provides a complete framework, including the strategy and policy document on how to implement DDRR in Nigeria. The key elements of the document include the design and processes of DDRR; the legal framework that supports its implementation; the distinction and allocation of roles to various agencies and; a framework for monitoring and evaluation. The objectives of the National Framework on DDRR is to facilitate the process of transitional justice, prepare communities for the eventual reintegration of both perpetrators and victims, strengthen justice dispensation and ensure stability in North East Nigeria. The implementation of this Framework must be in parallel with interventions that seek to address the root causes of violent extremism. The Framework has been designed to act as guide; it is flexible and adaptable to any conflict situation. It targets perpetrators, victims and affected communities, including the roles to be played by state and non-state security providers. Vulnerable groups such as women, youth, children and persons with disability are key beneficiaries of the Framework and it is important that target interventions take into consideration their peculiar needs since they have an important roles in preventing/countering violent extremism.



INTRODUCTION

Boko Haram, commonly known as *Jamaatul Ahl al-Sunna Li Dawaati wal Jihad*, emerged in the late 1990s⁸ in the North East of Nigeria, ostensibly with the motive of enforcing an extremist religious agenda.⁹ Within a decade, the group had transformed from a machete-wielding sect to one of the world's deadliest terror groups. Since 2009, Boko Haram is reported to have killed almost 17,000 individuals and displaced nearly 2.2 million people, mostly in Nigeria's North East. In 2015, the group pledged allegiance to the Islamic state (Daesh). However, Boko Haram is not a single unit. Over the years, major factions have emerged, culminating in the 2016 split between Shekau and Al-Barnawi. The debate about the causes of the conflict has been linked to religious, political, socio-economic and historical reasons,¹ although the response to the conflict has been largely rooted in military offensive and covert political negotiations. The perceived military successes compelled President Buhari to declare on 24 December, 2015 that Boko Haram had been “technically defeated.”¹⁰ However, this term is debatable as the extremist ideology still thrives, while pockets of violence and kidnapping mark the group's continued existence and strength.

The Nigerian Counter Terrorism Strategy, the recent Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, recognised that:

Violent extremism has become alarmingly widespread in different parts of the country, often in partnership with organised crime, including rural banditry and cattle-rustling; violence fuelled by the resurgence of ethnic self-determination; youth militancy and agitation framed

*around ecological degradation of the oil-producing communities and their perceived neglect by the Government; herders-farmers clashes, kidnapping for ransom, and ethno-religious violent clashes.*¹¹

The National Strategy also acknowledged that military force alone cannot combat violent extremist elements in Nigeria and that a multi-faceted approach is required to counter the threat of violent extremism.

The Office of the National Security Advisor (ONSA) was tasked with developing an ambitious countering violent extremism (CVE) programme. This led to the National Security Strategy signed by former President Goodluck Jonathan in 2014. By 2015, ONSA had developed a CVE guide that consisted of three components: counter radicalisation; de-radicalisation and strategic communications. The de-radicalisation element of the CVE programme includes the rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders who are arrested, convicted, sentenced or awaiting trial according to the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA). Operation Safe Corridor was then developed to rehabilitate repentant Boko Haram members. In 2016, the CVE Guide and the National Security Strategy were reviewed, and the National Counter Terrorism Strategy (NACTEST) which was designed to forestall, secure, identify, prepare and implement strategies that will counter violent extremism, was produced.

Based on the elements defined in NACTEST, ONSA produced the Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism. The

⁸ Cook, David. (2011). “The Rise of Boko Haram in Nigeria”. CTC Sentinel 4(9):4.

⁹ Chasmar, Jessica. (2014). “Boko Haram Leader Declares Islamic Caliphate in Nigeria”, The Washington Times, August 24, 2014. Cf. <http://www.washingtontimes.com/.../boko-haram-leader-declares-caliphate-nig> (accessed August 27, 2014).

¹⁰ How Nur, Shekau Run Boko Haram,” Vanguard, September 3, 2011; “Profile of Nigeria's Boko Haram leader Abubakar Shekau,” BBC, June 4, 2013

¹¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria, 2017. Policy Framework and National Action Plan for Preventing and Countering Violent Extremism, Partnership for Safer and Resilient Communities, August 2017, p. 9.

National Action Plan is supported by constitutional, legal and policy instruments.

The Policy Framework articulates a plan that requires various stakeholders to participate in building secure and resilient communities in the face of violent extremism using whole of government and whole of society approaches. It does not provide guidelines on how these approaches can be integrated into the specific components of the DDDR processes.

The proposed DDDR National Framework is developed by The Kukah Centre with the support of NERI, and it is intended to fill this gap. Its primary objective is to contribute to security and stability in the North East in particular, and in Nigeria in general, so that recovery and development can begin in troubled areas. The framework is accompanied by an Implementation Strategy and a Policy Brief intended to guide its implementation process.

STRUCTURE OF THE DDDR NATIONAL FRAMEWORK

This framework is divided into five components. The first component provides a background to the DDDR framework in Nigeria. It explains the concepts of Demobilisation, Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration, and places it within the context of the current conflicts in Nigeria. The Framework also presents the nature of the DDDR processes, the actors and the beneficiaries. The second component outlines the legal framework for DDDR in Nigeria. It presents the international and regional legal provisions that support DDDR programmes to underscore existing constitutional instruments, legal frameworks and policy recommendations at the national level that should facilitate DDDR programmes. The framework also supports the need for domesticating instruments for the implementation of a cogent DDDR framework for Nigeria. It makes recommendations for the harmonisation of all DDDR legal instruments. This includes the Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA) 2011 (amended in 2013), as well as jurisdiction on issues of international persons. The fourth component presents an aspect of the framework that caters for special persons, including women, children of violent extremist offenders, unaccompanied children, the elderly, and persons living with disabilities. Finally, the framework has an annex, which contains the implementation strategy and a policy brief that facilitates the process of implementing DDDR programmes in Nigeria.

BACKGROUND TO THE DDDR NATIONAL FRAMEWORK

Successive governments in Nigeria recognise that violent extremism poses a significant threat to national stability, socio-economic development and democratisation. The Boko Haram insurgency has destroyed hundreds of Nigerian communities and created an unprecedented humanitarian crisis in the North East region. The group has abducted thousands of boys, girls and women, forcing some into marriage and turning others into combatants or suicide bombers.¹² The conflict has also created a political economy of violence. Security stakeholders, politicians, and national and international non-governmental organisations appear to exploit the conflict for all forms of interests.¹³ There has also been a massive increase in the proliferation of illegal weapons with over 70% of at least 8 million illegal weapons in West Africa, in Nigeria.¹⁴ Furthermore, the conflict has led to an increase in human trafficking, the emergence of combatant non-state actors such as the Civilian JTF, local vigilantes, and informal community security outfits.

The effects of the Boko Haram insurgency require a multi-faceted and multi-stakeholder approach that is adaptable to the peculiar historical, political, socio-cultural and economic contexts of the North-East region. Community engagement, reconciliation, transitional justice, rehabilitation and reintegration of victims and perpetrators must be integrated into a comprehensive strategy to counter violent extremism and promote sustainable peace. The DDDR National Framework provides a comprehensive strategy that can be used to contribute to stability.

¹² Barkindo Atta and Shephard Michelle. 2014. "The Abduction of School Girls by Boko Haram", Toronto Star, 26 April, 2014.

¹³ Alike, Ejiolor, 2012. "NNPC Loses Millions of Dollars on Crude Oil Exploration in Chad Basin". Thisday, 14 October, 2014; The Cable News, 2014. "Exclusive: Chad 'fuelling' Boko Haram insurgency with eyes on Borno oil deposits" (accessed 24 October, 2015). <https://www.thecable.ng/exclusive-chad-fuelling-boko-haram-insurgency-eyes-borno-oil-deposits>.

¹⁴ Freedom C. Onuoha, 2013. Porous Borders and Boko Haram's Arms Smuggling Operations in Nigeria, Aljazeera Centre for Studies, p. 1-8.

NATIONAL FRAMEWORK ON DDDR IN NIGERIA

Demobilisation, De-radicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration of persons associated with violent conflict is a complex process, with political, military, security, religious, humanitarian and socio-economic dimensions as demonstrated in the following sections.

DEMOBILIZATION

Demobilization is a three –stage process that defines the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or non-state armed groups. The first stage is disarmament which is the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.¹⁵ The second stage is the classification or verification of ex-combatants who have been disarmed. This means processing individuals to determine their ideological commitment to the group, as well as assessing the level of risk they may pose to society. They are divided into different temporary camps or facilities such as cantonment sites, encampments, assembly areas or barracks designated for this purpose. The final stage of demobilisation encompasses the framework designed to de-radicalise and rehabilitate ex-combatants in order to prepare them for reintegration into communities.¹⁶

Objectives:

The aim of demobilization is to prepare ex-combatants for deradicalisation and rehabilitation to ensure the reduction or cessation of conflict in communities. Demobilization may also entail programmes that prevent the proliferation of small arms and light weapons including legislation and responsible arms management programmes to reduce to the barest minimum the illegal access to small arms and light weapons. .

Legal Framework for Demobilisation:

There are various legal frameworks and provisions that support DDDR processes both at the international, regional and national levels. It is important to underscore these frameworks for successful DDDR programme in Nigeria. This is because the framework is based on, and designed to benefit from these legal protocols. They also demonstrate Nigeria's firm commitment to international best practices in the implementation of demobilization programmes. Below are highlights from relevant legal instruments for deradicalisation:

At the international level, the United Nations Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards, 2006, section 1 Paragraph 10, recommends demobilization as a process to prepare ex-combatants to acquire civilian status and subsequently reinserted into society.

The Ankara Memorandum, Articles 6 to 8, calls for "a Multi-Sectoral Approach to Countering Violent Extremism" with demobilization recommended as the first stage of this process.

Regional protocols such as the African Defence and Security Policy (CADSP), no. 274, para 5, provides that it is important to: *'plan and implement comprehensive and well blended disarmament, demobilization, rehabilitation and reintegration (DDRR) programmes, as a basis for consolidating safety and security.'*¹⁷

At the national level, Nigerian Firearms Act (1990) provides that "No persons shall have in his possession or under his control any firearm or ammunition except such person has a licence from the President or from the Inspector General

¹⁵ United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), Practice Note: Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration of Ex-Combatants, p. 11-12.

¹⁶ Socio Economic Profiling and Opportunity Mapping Manual-,Irma Specht- Transitional International.

¹⁷ Report on the Elaboration of a Framework Document on Post Conflict Reconstruction and Development (PCRD) EX.CL/274 (IX), Banjul, The Gambia, in July 2006, para 25.

This framework identifies the ongoing debate on appropriate terminology for CVE interventions especially as it relates to the concept of deradicalisation, and adopts radicalisation in a very broad sense to imply the term dissociation.

of Police.”¹⁸ Section 8, no. 36 empowers the State to seize all unclaimed and unlicensed arms and ammunitions, making demobilization legal and necessary.

There are special groups of people that are legally covered by different legal frameworks that govern demobilization. International Conference of the Red Cross and Red Crescent, which brings together all components of the Movement and State Parties to the Geneva Convention expanded the scope of Special Groups to include women, children, persons living with disabilities, the elderly and other vulnerable groups during armed conflict.¹⁹ The First Protocol to the Geneva Conventions, Article 77(2) of 1977 provides that “the parties to the conflict shall take all feasible measures in order that children who have not attained the age of fifteen years do not take a direct part in hostilities.” Additional Protocol II, Article 4(3)(c) of 1977 also provides that “children who have not attained the age of 15 shall ... [not be] allowed to take part in hostilities.”

Implementing Agency:

The lead implementing agency for demobilization should be the Nigerian Army. The process should also involve non-state actors such as technical experts, families of ex-combatants, community leaders and relevant ministries, departments and agencies within the government. The Operation Safe Corridor (OSC) Programme, situated in Gombe State should be recognized as the national agency for demobilization. Legitimation of OSC in Gombe requires that the national legislature pass an appropriate Act supporting and reinforcing the process. The process of this implementation, including the actors is clearly explained in the implementation strategy, provided as annex to this document.

Risks and Emerging Issues in Demobilization:

-It is important to recognise that demobilisation may not necessarily lead to a cessation of hostilities in a post-conflict environment. There's a risk that ex-combatants may not surrender all their arms for fear of reprisal attacks from those perceived to be enemies or from victims seeking revenge. This makes it difficult to minimise the proliferation of small arms and light weapons and poses a threat to community peace.

-Nigeria does not have the requisite framework that governs the demobilization of special groups such as women and children. Demobilization programmes are designed to cater for male ex-combatants whereas women and children also engage in active combat. The failure to

tailor these programmes to their needs could pose a security risk to the communities in which they will reintegrate eventually.

-The demobilization of non-state security actors such as the civilian JTF who support the army during military operations in the North East, needs to take into consideration the complexities associated with disarming a group whose power and authority in communities is derived from the carrying of weapons and the crucial role they play in community policing. The government might need to integrate them into the Armed Forces or legitimise their role as community security providers in post conflict environment. The National Security Architecture should be reviewed to include non-state security providers such as vigilantes who can act as community security providers to ensure protection of lives and property. A framework for the integration of these informal groups would streamline their roles and responsibilities and ensure that they act within the law and respect the rights of citizens.

DERADICALISATION

Deradicalisation is a process designed to alter the attitudes of ex-combatants who harbour radical ideologies that support the use of violence to propagate a cause. Deradicalisation is a non-linear process that seeks to promote mental and physical desistance from acts of violence. It is a complex process that must be supported by programmes that promote behavioural change since it may be difficult to demonstrate any significant changes in attitude without a change in behaviour. This framework identifies the ongoing debate on appropriate terminology for CVE interventions especially as it relates to the concept of deradicalisation, and adopts radicalisation in a very broad sense to imply the term dissociation.

Dissociation is a process whereby the links between ex-combatants and violent extremist groups are severed through multifarious processes. Thus, Dissociation from violent extremist groups is an important aspect of disengagement from violence and can reduce the risk of recidivism when ex-combatants are reintegrated into society. It is important that communities, families, civil society organizations and religious leaders continue to facilitate the process of dissociation as required. It is important to disaggregate the various layers of association of ex combatants with extremist groups and engage different stakeholders in devising an appropriate process of

¹⁸ Firearms Act, Chapter 146, Laws of Federation 1990

¹⁹ 14th Bruges Colloquium – October 7th and 8th 2013. Keynote Address Ms. Christine Beerli, ICRC Vice President

dissociation. The process should address the challenge of stigmatisation because when ex-combatants cannot be accepted by the communities, this increases their vulnerability of being re-recruited voluntarily or otherwise.

The Department of Behavioural Analysis (DBA) of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) conceived and began the implementation of Deradicalisation of Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) with assistance from European Union in 2014. Kuje Medium Security Prison in the FCT was the chosen custodial facility for the initial implementation of this procedure. Experts were engaged and staff of Nigerian Prisons Services were trained on this process. Minimum international standards were observed in addition to ensuring judicial process and respect for human rights and rule of law.

Available information indicates that VEOs that are undergoing deradicalisation at Kuje Prison have had their risk levels substantially reduced. This programme has been replicated and extended to other prisons within the country. Operation Safe Corridor also incorporates elements of Deradicalisation programmes at their camp in Gombe where Nigeria Prison Service personnel are drafted to support the process. A large number of VEOs requires that there are multi-disciplinary trained personnel and facilities that meet a minimum standard to cater for a significant number of deradicalisation programmes. The slow judicial process in the trial of VEOs has been a major constraint in sentence planning and scheduling of the de-radicalization process.

Legal Framework for Deradicalisation

The legal framework supporting deradicalisation is patchy, and at national level, grossly inadequate. The Terrorism Prevention Act (TPA), which is the major law on Terrorism in Nigeria, does not have a single provision on the process of deradicalisation.

Nigeria's legal provisions and her commitments to international law only attempt to demonstrate that deradicalisation is remotely guided by specific legal provisions as indicated below:

Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria 1999 - Chapter 4 of the Nigerian Constitution covers all aspects of human rights of citizens (mostly the civil and political variants) and is thus applicable to all institutions and not just prisons. The rights enshrined in Chapter 4 cover matters that are directly relevant to the programme, including the rights to life, dignity, liberty, fair hearing, religion, freedom of expression, non-discrimination, gender. Nigeria's CVE programme undertakes to respect human rights and rule of law in its implementation at all stages. This is a significant undertaking.

Section 35(1) (e) of the Constitution provides for conditions under which a person may be deprived of their liberty: *“Every person shall be entitled to his personal liberty and no person shall be deprived of such liberty save in the following cases and in accordance with a procedure permitted by law ... in the case of persons suffering from infectious or contagious disease, persons of unsound mind, persons addicted to drugs or alcohol or vagrants, for the purpose of their care or treatment or the protection of the community”*

Section 38. (1) also provides that *“Every person shall be entitled to freedom of thought, conscience and religion, including freedom to change his religion or belief, and freedom (either alone or in community with others, and in public or in private) to manifest and propagate his religion or belief in worship, teaching, practice and observance.”*

Section 39 provides for the protection of the rights of citizens to hold opinions. This implies that deradicalisation programmes must also respect the freedom of thought and religion as expressed by VEOs.

-Section 45 however provides a leeway for making extant laws in support of a deradicalisation programme by providing for the defence of public safety, the rights and freedoms of other persons, during a state of emergency and acts of war.

Nigeria Prison Service Act 2004

The Nigeria Prisons Service (NPS) is a Government agency within the exclusive administrative purview of the Federal Government. The Nigeria Prison Service Act 2004 defines the mandate of the Nigeria Prison service. S. 2(1) gives the Minister power to declare any place or building as a prison. S. 2(4) of the NPS Act provides that:

“the Minister may for the effecting the separation of classes of prisoners or for training of any class of prisoners or for any other purpose, by order in the Federal Gazette appropriate any prison or part of a prison to particular classes of prisoners; and any prisoner of the class to which any prison or part of a prison has been appropriated may lawfully be conveyed thereto and imprisoned therein”.

The Nigerian Prison Manual (1985) empowers Nigerian Prison to reform, rehabilitate and reintegrate all prisoners within its custody.

Terrorism Prevention Act 2011 (TPA) as amended in 2013

The TPA not only provides the necessary authority and mandate, but provides detail on some of the key rights and obligations relevant to the programme.

²⁰ Including but not limited to physicians, psychologists, psychiatrists, pharmacists, social workers, vocational trainers, clerics,

Terrorism Prevention Act 2011

Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013

Legal application

(2) The Attorney General of the Federation shall be the authority for the effective implementation and administration of this Act and shall strengthen and enhance the existing legal framework to ensure -

- (a) conformity of terrorism laws and policies with international standards and United Nations Conventions on Terrorism;
- (b) maintain international co-operation required for preventing and combating international acts of terrorism; and
- (c) the effective prosecution of terrorism matters

Detention

42 - (1) The court may, pursuant to an ex-parte application, grant an order for the detention of a suspect under this Act for a period not exceeding 90 days subject to renewal for a similar period until the conclusion of the investigation and prosecution of the matter that led to the arrest and detention is dispensed with

Powers of the Nigerian Prisons Service

CAP 366 Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 1990

- take into lawful custody all those certified to be so kept by courts of competent jurisdiction;
- produce suspects in courts as and when due;
- identify the causes of their anti-social dispositions;
- set in motion mechanisms for their treatment and training for eventual reintegration into society as normal law abiding citizens on discharge; and
- administer Prisons Farms and Industries for this purpose and in the process generate revenue for the government.

When a deradicalisation programme is implemented in a Nigerian Prison, the NPS Standing Orders²¹ in tandem with Chapter IV of the Constitution, provide operational guidelines for safe and humane custody. This includes conditions of, and treatment in, detention. These are obligations of the State, and critical enabling factors for the programme.

Administration of Criminal Justice (ACJ) Act 2015

The majority of participants in a deradicalisation programme are in conflict with the law. The TPA is very detailed in listing offences and identifying sentences, however, the Administration of Criminal Justice (ACJ) Act 2015 remains the most comprehensive Federal legislation in the administration of criminal justice. It purports to promote efficient management of criminal justice institutions; speedy dispensation of justice; protection of the society from crime and; protection of the rights and interests of the suspect, the defendant, and the victim.

Specifically, Act 232 (4) provides that: *The provision of this section shall apply to: (b) offences under the Terrorism (Prevention) Amendment Act.* Nigeria's De-radicalisation programme is meant to be implemented in the context of this Act. The Act also stipulates certain provisions for the protection of victims of crime.

Regional Human Rights and Rule of Law Framework:

There are a number of regional instruments that provide a framework within which Nigeria's deradicalisation programmes should operate.²² They form part of the international human rights obligations to which Nigeria is internationally held accountable. The regional legal frameworks are:

- * African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights (Ratification and Enforcement) Act, 2004 LFN²³ - being an Act to enable effect to be given in the Federal Republic of Nigeria to the **African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights** made in Banjul on the 19th day of January 1981
- * Kampala Declaration on Prison Conditions in Africa
- * Arusha Declaration on Good Prison Practice
- * Kampala Declaration on Prison Health in Africa
- * Lilongwe Declaration on Accessing Legal Aid in the Criminal Justice System in Africa
- * Guidelines and Measures for the Prohibition and Prevention of Torture, Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading

²¹ Federal Republic of Nigeria Official Gazette No. 122 Lagos—31st December, 2011 Vol. 98

²² <http://www.humanrights.se/wp-content/uploads/2012/01/African-Charter-on-Human-and-Peoples-Rights.pdf>, <http://www.penalreform.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/05/rep-2008-AfricasRecommendations-en-1.pdf>, <http://www.achpr.org/sessions/52nd/resolutions/228/>

²³ LFN - Laws of the Federation of Nigeria 2004

- Treatment or Punishment in Africa (The Robben Island Guidelines)
- * Principles and Guidelines on the Right to Fair Trial and Legal Assistance in Africa
- * Principles and Guidelines on the Conditions of Arrest, Police Custody and Pre-trial Detention in Africa, adopted by the African Commission in October 2014 in Luanda, Angola and ECOWAS Protocol on Democracy and Good Governance.²⁴

International Human Rights and Rule of Law Framework

There are various international instruments and forms of guidance that apply to all persons in places of detention and within which any deradicalisation programme should take place. These include:

- * UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners, now referred to as Mandela Rules; UN Code of Conduct for Law Enforcement Officers;
- * UN Standard Minimum Rules for the Administration of Juvenile Justice (the Beijing Rules);
- * UN Guidelines for the Prevention of Juvenile Delinquency (the Riyadh Guidelines); UN Rules for the Protection of Juveniles Deprived of their Liberty;

- * UN Rules on the Treatment of Women Prisoners and Non-Custodial Measures for Women Offenders (Bangkok Rules);
- * World Medical Association Declaration of Tokyo - Guidelines for Physicians Concerning Torture and other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment in Relation to Detention and Imprisonment and UN Principles of Medical Ethics relevant to the Role of Health Personnel, particularly Physicians, in the Protection of Prisoners and Detainees against Torture and Other Cruel, Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment.²⁵
- * Article 4 of the International Convention on Civil and Political Rights (ICCPR) sets out a number of rights from which States are not allowed to derogate, even in times of public emergency and threats to national security. Specifically Article 18, (replicated in section 38 of the Nigerian Constitution) provides for the freedom of thought, conscience and religion. Nigeria has ratified a number of Human Rights related international instruments which provide important parameters for deradicalisation programs.

International Human Rights Instruments Ratified by Nigeria

Treaty	Signature Date	Ratification Date, Accession(a), Succession(d)
CAT - Convention against Torture and Other Cruel Inhuman or Degrading Treatment or Punishment	28 Jul 1988,	28 Jun 2001
CAT-OP - Optional Protocol of the Convention against Torture		27 Jul 2009 (a)
CCPR - International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights		29 Jul 1993 (a)
CCPR-OP2-DP - Second Optional Protocol to the International Covenant on Civil and Political Rights aiming to the abolition of the death penalty		
CED - Convention for the Protection of All Persons from Enforced Disappearance		27 Jul 2009 (a)
CEDAW - Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Discrimination against Women	23 Apr 1984	13 Jun 1985
CERD - International Convention on the Elimination of All Forms of Racial Discrimination		16 Oct 1967 (a)
CESCR - International Covenant on Economic, Social and Cultural Rights		29 Jul 1993 (a)
CRC - Convention on the Rights of the Child	26 Jan 1990	19 Apr 1991
CRC-OP-AC - Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict	08 Sep 2000	25 Sep 2012

²⁴ Articles 4,5 and 6; Declaration on prisons conditions and prison staff 1996; Arusha, Tanzania 23-27 February 1999; Legal aid in Action: In Prisons, The Lilongwe Declaration 2004; Article M provisions applicable to arrest and detention (1999); Parts 3, 4, 5,6,7,8 Principles and Guidelines Luanda 2014; Articles 19-24, Dakar, December 2001.

²⁵ <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/treatmentprisoners.pdf>; <http://www.ohchr.org/Documents/ProfessionalInterest/codeofconduct.pdf>; <https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles1/Digitization/145271NCJRS.pdf>; <https://www.crin.org/docs/resources/publications/hrbap/IHCRC/UnitedNationsGuidelinesforthePreventionofjuvenileDelinquency.pdf>; <http://www.un.org/documents/ga/res/45/a45r113.htm>; <http://www.un.org/en/ecosoc/docs/2010/res%6202010-16.pdf>; <http://www.wma.net/en/30publications/10policies/c18/> and <http://www.ohchr.org/EN/ProfessionalInterest/Pages/MedicalEthics.aspx>

NIGERIA'S DERADICALISATION PROGRAMME

Deradicalisation of VEOs is implemented in two designated places; the Nigerian Prisons Service and the Operation Safe Corridor camp at Gombe.

The deradicalisation programme at the NPS is legitimized by the preceding laws, while a similar programme at Operation Safe Corridor does not have the requisite legal backing to operate effectively. As an urgent fixture to this anomaly, an amendment of the TPA should be contemplated, deriving powers from Section 45 of the Constitution. However, inclusion of a Community Based Deradicalisation Programme may be contemplated as this is paramount for a multi-faceted approach to Countering Violent Extremism (CVE).

Prison-Based Deradicalisation Programme

Prison-based deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes are designed to reform violent extremist offenders and reintegrate them into society. Typically, deradicalisation programmes operate in just a handful of jurisdictions and are embedded in the cultures and societies in which they are developed and delivered with limited information on the structure and the types of approaches used. Global Counter Terrorism Forum members have identified a series of non-binding good practices such as the *Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders* and the *Ankara Memorandum* that can serve as the foundation for state policies and programmes. The implementation of these practices must adhere to international and national laws if they are to be effective. It is essential that these practices are tailored to the peculiarities of the local contexts for successful reintegration to occur - lessons can also be learned from other jurisdictions who have implemented prison-based deradicalisation programmes for violent extremist offenders.

The Nigeria Prison Service Deradicalisation programme was established in 2015 with the mandate to deradicalize and rehabilitate violent extremist offenders who are convicted, undergoing trial or awaiting trial. The effects of these programmes is typically measured through risk assessments to ascertain changes in attitude and behaviour before, during and after targeted interventions to establish whether or not an ex-combatant is prepared for reintegration. The prison deradicalisation programme still requires trained personnel to conduct these interventions and adequate facilities to ensure that the minimum standards for the treatment for prisoners are upheld.

Risks and Emerging Issues

- * The Attorney-General of the Federation is the exclusive prosecutor which means that the Federal High Court has exclusive jurisdiction over the trial of suspects- this causes significant delays in the administration of the criminal justice system for suspects.

- * The roles and responsibilities of actors involved in the prison based deradicalisation programme need are yet to be streamlined and linked to the application of the TPA. This makes coordination of actors difficult and can easily create interagency rivalries that may undermine the objectives of the programme.
- * Effective monitoring and evaluation mechanisms need to be developed and implemented to review the programmes and adapt them accordingly to ensure that they are results-based.
- * There is limited access to information about the prison-based deradicalization programme and this has created a misperception the programme is intended to reward violent extremist offenders. This needs to be addressed as it could easily undermine the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities.
- * The deradicalisation programme is currently supported by the EU Delegation in Nigeria. It is therefore essential that the government allocates resources for this intervention in the annual budget of NPS and other relevant agencies to aid its expansion to other prisons and actualisation of its long-term objectives.

Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC)

Following the vigorous attempts in September 2015 to subdue Boko Haram fighters, it became clear that there were insurgents who were willing to lay down their arms and cease fighting. The Federal Government, working with the armed forces, designed a programme for those who are “willing, repentant and surrendered” to be admitted into a safe haven for rehabilitation.

In practice, those who surrender are required to pass through “*Operation Lafia Dole*” (OLD), a Command Centre set up to respond to the insurgency. OLD screens the surrendered combatants to determine their level of involvement in the conflict. If they were actively involved in combat they are then sent to prison as they await trial while others who were not are processed, profiled and sent to Operation Safe Corridor to participate in the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. At Operation Safe Corridor, ex-combatants are subjected to an advanced profiling system where their biometrics and DNA samples are registered in a database before they are issued national identity cards. They are also subjected to interrogation to obtain information that might be of use to security agencies. Operation Safe Corridor is led by the Nigerian military and supported by Ministries of Health, Education, Labour and Productivity among others. International development agencies provide technical assistance where necessary as ex-combatants undergo a 16-week deradicalisation and rehabilitation programme.

Legal Framework

-There is no specific law that supports the operationalisation of Operation Safe Corridor. However, Nigeria is obligated to respect and protect human rights of

all persons in its territory. Section 14 (2) (b) of the Constitution²⁶ provides a general background to the responsibility of government with respect to security and welfare of the people. SS.34, 35 and 36 of the Constitution protects citizens' rights to dignity, liberty and fair hearing. In Nigeria, law enforcement institutions can only legitimately undertake deprivation of liberty in limited circumstances which must be in accordance with the law (the principle of legality), and, for the exclusive purposes enumerated under S. 35 of the 1999 Constitution. Principle of legality is violated “if an individual is arrested or detained on grounds which are not clearly established in domestic legislation”.

Therefore, deprivations of liberty must not be arbitrary. The UN Human Rights Committee defines “arbitrary arrest” under Article 9(1) as one in which the remand in custody is not only lawful but also reasonable and necessary in all the circumstances. Thus, detention of persons without formal charges and reasonable prospect of bail constitutes arbitrary arrest.

Risks and Emerging Issues:

* Some violent extremist offenders who have committed egregious crimes may be mistakenly accepted into Operation Safe Corridor. It is important that the profiling of repentant combatants is thorough to minimise such risks. The scientific tools required to conduct risk assessments and classification of repentant combatants at Operation Safe Corridor have not been developed or adopted for use at the camp. This is dangerous as it may increase the risk of recidivism. Operation Safe Corridor is a military initiative that requires the active involvement of actors mandated to conduct civil policing. Military involvement in internal security functions is deprecated since its mandate is to protect the country against external foreign aggression.

- * Programming at Operation Safe Corridor is ad hoc – there is an absence of an overarching programme strategy and an effective monitoring and evaluation framework to assess the impact of interventions on the attitude and behaviour of repentant combatants.
- * There is a lack of effective tools for training, therapies and treatments for the repentant combatants which could easily undermine the objectives of Operation Safe Corridor.
- * Operation Safe Corridor should engage qualified local personnel to conduct deradicalisation programmes specifically psychological counselling and countering of extremist narratives.
- * A system to monitor ex-combatants when they are released from Operation Safe Corridor is yet to be developed- this makes it difficult to ascertain the impact of interventions and create an evidence- based strategy to improve outcomes of the programme.

RECOMMENDATIONS

- The role of security agencies should be limited to their constitutional mandates for the effective implementation of DDDR Framework. These processes need to be demilitarised, and the requisite stakeholders charged with leading on these programmes be equipped to implement them. The role of the military should be limited to demobilization and provision of security at programme facilities.
- The deradicalisation programmes should be led by experts and qualified professionals. Further training should be given to other sub-groups that will be needed on the programme to improve understanding of the laws and historical, socio-economic, and religious contexts that could affect the design and implementation of the targeted interventions.

Key Actors:

S/N	Key Agencies	Role/ Responsibility
01	ONSA	To coordinate the activities of OSC
02	AFN	Provide security, coordination and leadership
03	NPS	Deradicalisation and rehabilitation of VEOs
04	DSS	Intelligence and assisting in demobilisation
05	NIS	Intelligence and tackling cross border movement of VEOs
06	NSCDC	Local intelligence gathering and assisting in demobilization
07	NEMA	Provision of Relief services, not just materials
08	NDLEA	Rehabilitating VEOs who are drug addicts
09	NOA	Re-orienting VEOs to be peace agents
10	FMWASD	Providing psycho-social support and economic empowerment
11	NDE	Provision of skills and skills development
12	NYSC	Provision of social support
13	NIMC	Collation of Database of VEOs

-There should be staff rotation for personnel engaged in Operation Safe Corridor to reduce the risk of burn out and also to ensure that there is a significant number of personnel in the government who have the capacity and knowledge to work in such programmes.

-The legal framework that supports the implementation of deradicalisation programmes should be designed, debated and passed into law by the legislature to guide the processes and to avoid future litigations. . There is need to initiate concrete plans to involve relevant MDAs like Ministry of Health, Sports and Education.

-As a temporary cover, since the process of law-making is cumbersome and time consuming, it is suggested that all candidates for Operation Safe Corridor be charged to court with a single prayer for the court to order their detention in Operation Safe Corridor for a clear term. An invocation of S.42 of TPA in court would effect this change.

-The current 16-week period allocated for deradicalisation and rehabilitation is inadequate. It lacks community participation and consultation, and is likely to encounter serious obstacles from the community during reintegration. As such, the period should be reviewed and a long term curriculum of engagement should be developed to carry out a comprehensive programme.

-There is need to conduct an independent expert assessment of current operational strengths and weaknesses of Operation Safe Corridor to position the programme for optimal impact.

REHABILITATION

Rehabilitation is the purposeful and planned intervention aimed at providing the capacity and skillsets for deradicalized/disengaged former violent extremist offenders (VEOs) to cope after being released from detention and while being reintegrated into wider society. These interventions could range from social and vocational skills to formal education, mental health support, cognitive skills and improvement in attitudes, societal perception and personality.²⁷ In reality, there is a thin line between rehabilitation and deradicalisation - rehabilitation seeks to improve the social and economic status of ex-combatants while, deradicalisation aims to achieve attitudinal and *behavioural change*. Both seek to adjust the individual to the peaceful expectations of society, as well as prepare them for a meaningful and productive life. Furthermore, forestalling recidivism in former VEOs is at the core of all DDDR programmes. Hence rehabilitation is a critical component

and must synchronise with all other components of the programme.

Because of the complexity of managing cases arising from violent extremism, rehabilitation programmes require the expertise of multiple networks of experts. These experts generally include psychologists, psychiatrists, religious scholars, sport instructors, art therapists, social workers, vocational guidance and Counsellors, teachers, medical personnel.

Objectives:

Rehabilitation is intended to provide former VEOs with the knowledge, capacity and skills that will facilitate their social and economic reintegration post-release. It is also intended to prepare communities to receive these ex-combatants when they are released into their care.

National Legal Framework for Rehabilitation:

There are existing national legal frameworks and provisions that support rehabilitation in Nigeria. Some of these include:

Nigeria Prison Service Standing Order 2011 - the Nigeria Prison Service Standing Order provides the operational guidelines for safe and humane custody which also includes condition of treatment in detention. Interestingly, the Constitutional Amendment of 1990 had proposed in provision 366²⁸ the objectives of the Nigeria Prison Service to be:

“(a) to keep safe custody of persons who are legally entered; (b) to identify the causes of their anti-social behaviour, treat and reform them to become disciplined and law abiding citizens of a free society; (c) to train them toward their eventual reformation, rehabilitation and re-integration to the society after their discharge; (d) to generate funds for the government through prison farms and industries”

The direct inclusion of this provision as an amendment into the Prison Service Act will provide a stronger legal backing for its role in the DDDR process.

Children and Young Persons Act, LFN, 2004 and the **Child Rights Act, 2003** provide that the best interest of the child is to be of paramount consideration – this must be taken into consideration in the design, monitoring and implementation of the DDDR processes.

Borstal Training Institutions and Remand Centres Act & Borstal Institutions and Remand Centres Regulation LFN, 2004 relate to the designation of a building as a remand

²⁷ Tinka Veldhuis (2012) Designing Rehabilitation and Reintegration Programmes for Violent Extremist Offenders: A Realist Approach ICCT Research Paper, p. 2

²⁸ The Nigerian Academic Forum Volume 20 No. 1 April, 2011

centre for the detention of persons not less than sixteen but less than twenty-one years of age who are remanded or committed in custody for trial or sentence. This law also stipulates that a Borstal institution can detain offenders between 16 and 21 years of age on the day of conviction. Training and instruction is meant to be provided to the offenders for their reformation during detention.

Geneva Convention Act, LFN, 2004

This Act domesticates Geneva conventions of 1949 into Nigeria domestic legal frame work pursuant to section 12 of the CFRN 1999 as amended.

International Legal Framework

The Ankara Memorandum on Good Practices for a Multi-Sectional Approach to Countering Violent Extremism addresses the role of government institutions, agencies and civil society at the local, national, regional and international levels in CVE. It is intended to complement the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders in custodial settings. The Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders, provides an excellent blueprint for prison disengagement and rehabilitation of VEOs.

Existing Structures for Rehabilitation:

It is necessary to consider existing and potential structures for rehabilitation. At the moment, the Nigerian Prisons Service is entrusted with the statutory responsibility of rehabilitating all offenders. As such, prisons remain useful structures for rehabilitation since they are a controlled environment for monitoring implementation. Borstal Institutions and Remand Centres which are primarily established for the rehabilitation and provision of vocational skills for juvenile and young persons in conflict with the law, are also in existence. These can be excellent centres for rehabilitating children and young people associated with Boko Haram. Community centres can also be adopted for community-based rehabilitation programmes.

Risks and Emerging Issues:

- * There are gaps in the legal and institutional framework for rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders. The Standing Order under the Nigeria Prisons Act does not contain explicit provisions that can be invoked while tackling terrorism cases in Nigeria.
- * A coordinating body needs to be established to provide strategic oversight of rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders in Nigeria. The Nigeria Prison Service should take the lead on custodial rehabilitation while local agencies should be created to collaborate with the NPS on community-based rehabilitation programmes.

- * Community engagement needs to be integrated in rehabilitation programmes and conducted in parallel to interventions such as the Prison-based rehabilitation programme and Operation Safe Corridor. The failure to mainstream community engagements in these processes is likely to hinder reintegration of ex-combatants and increase the risk of recidivism.
- * The Federal and state governments should institute measures to administer unclaimed properties in post conflict environments. Populations tend to get displaced during violent conflict and may not return to the communities after peace returns. These unclaimed properties can be used for criminal activities and may also lead to community disputes when members contest ownership.

REINTEGRATION

Reintegration refers to a range of programmes that deal with the process of reinserting demobilised and rehabilitated VEOs, victims, and affected communities back into society. In other words, reintegration is a chain of socioeconomic processes through which former VEOs, who have held unto extremist beliefs and have been involved in various levels of violence, return to their communities and adjust to civilian life. The communities, many of them likely affected by the conflict, play an important role in the former VEOs' reintegration.²⁹ Reintegration therefore encapsulates all activities and programmes conducted to prepare an offender to return safely to the community and live as a law-abiding citizen.³⁰

The successful facilitation of reintegration includes community engagement and consultation. It also means including stakeholders and influencers, community leaders, traditional rulers and religious leaders in the design, evaluation and implementation of reintegration frameworks. This allows communities to take ownership of intervention programmes. It also provides the platform for experts to leverage on perspectives, concerns and initiatives of local communities to ensure that the programmes are successful. The failure to include local communities could lead to resentment, rejection and lack of clarity regarding challenges that could emerge from local contexts. Consequently, reintegration as understood in this framework is comprehensive and takes cognizance of the role to be played by different stakeholders.

Objectives of Reintegration: Conflicts will eventually come to an end, and the fractures created within communities will need to be mended with programmes of reconciliation and reintegration. Consequently, the objective of

²⁹ Lundin, Iraê Baptista, "Mechanisms of Community Reception of Demobilised Soldiers in Mozambique", African Journal of Political Science: 3 (1): 104-118, 1998

³⁰ Ibid

reintegration is to provide opportunities for perpetrators, victims and affected communities to return to, and lead stable lives. It is intended to build an inclusive society, create healthy relationships, promote tolerance, co-existence and respect for rights and privileges as community values. Above all, reintegration is intended to facilitate stable and peaceful transition from conflict in affected communities.

Guiding Principles of Reintegration: Certain guiding principles are essential for a successful reintegration programme. A human rights-based approach to reintegration is necessary to ensure that the rights of target groups are respected during the reintegration processes. It is therefore pertinent that reintegration is preceded by community engagement and consultation. Communities into which offenders will be integrated should be sensitised about their roles and responsibilities in monitoring and guiding reintegrated members. Such communities should first accept to take ownership of the roles they are expected to play before reintegration is implemented. Reintegrated individuals, particularly VEOs, retain the rights and privileges of all members of society, except those rights and privileges that are necessarily removed or restricted as a consequence of a sentence from a competent court. Reintegration policies, programs and practices, must necessarily respect gender, ethnic, cultural and linguistic differences and be responsive to the special needs of children, women and persons with special needs. Reintegration processes should respect the tenets and safeguards of criminal justice system, where applicable.

Elements Necessary for Reintegration Programmes: Reintegration programmes must take cognizance of the following:

A mapping of *Areas of return and resettlement* - must be carried out in consultation with communities and security services. Consequent upon the mapping, an appraisal of the socio-economic viability of the areas of return (including information on its natural resources, infrastructure, security situation, social capital, and perceptions of and willingness to accept former VEOs) should be made.

The skills and capacities of beneficiary former VEOs should be assessed to determine how they can best utilise their skills to maximise their placement. The assessment should include a profiling process that includes age, gender, marital status, dependents, education, health, needs and expectations. The results of these assessments will determine the location of their reinsertion, facilitate the process of monitoring and how best to guide those being reinserted.

Reintegration opportunities and services should also be considered. That is: determining employment opportunities (in the private or public sector as well as self-employment schemes,) and services in terms of education, training, access to credit, community mobilization among

others.

Reintegration should take place in communities that are convenient for both former VEOs and the host communities.

Core Activities and Levels of Reintegration: It is important to consider some core activities in implementing reintegration. Some of these activities include income generation support such as access to land (where possible), short-term public works, grants for small businesses and business development services.

Socio-economic reintegration is often particularly difficult for female ex-combatants, because of limited economic potentials, limited rights and access to productive resources, stigma, discrimination and trauma due to gender-based violence. Therefore, there is a need to ensure that female beneficiaries have a voice in determining the types of opportunities they are awarded, benefit from equal training and employment opportunities, and are protected from social marginalization.

The different levels of reintegration are:

- * **Economic reintegration:** Focuses on the provision of vocational training, apprenticeships, and life skills development for former VEOs and other persons affected by violence. However, it is important to note that this assistance ought to respond to the needs of the local labour market in order to ensure that former VEOs are employable.
- * **Social Reintegration:** Rebuilding trust between former VEOs and the communities is of paramount importance. Consequently, religious and/or other community-based organizations have a critical role to play in not only building consensus and cohesion, but also championing inclusiveness and tolerance. Additionally, community-based mechanisms that enhance cohesive social life should be established or reactivated in order to drive the reintegration agenda. Such mechanisms will include public works projects or community infrastructural development such as roads and schools; and cooperative business initiatives. Economic collaboration should be considered a critical lever for social integration.
- * **Cultural Reintegration - Sports, Arts and Culture:** Sports, arts and cultural programming are not just useful in delivering CVE content, but are powerful tools for integration. Sports, in particular, has an exceptional way of influencing the youth population in post-conflict communities - to address grievances, to provide a physical outlet for frustrations, and to provide a mechanism to address difficult topics such as health, conflict, safety and gender. In addition, sports provide opportunities for leadership, especially for young persons. It is documented fact that youth leadership

programs provide young people opportunities to effect change in their communities while developing key skills such as public speaking, problem-solving and creative/critical thinking.³¹

- * **Legal Framework for Reintegration:** There are no specific legal instruments that directly address reintegration in Nigeria's context. However it may be inferred that the Constitution provides that “the security and welfare of the people shall be the primary purpose of government”³² In addition, reintegration finds resonance in African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights.³³ Again, Section 5 (1)(d) of the Nigeria Prison Service Act of 2004 LFN specifically requires not only the rehabilitation of those in prison custody but their reintegration into community.

Risks and Emerging Issues on Reintegration:

- Prevailing conditions of poverty, insecurity and lack of economic opportunities may hinder the return of both perpetrators and victims back to the same communities.
- Failure by government agencies and non-government organisations to effectively engage host communities, and create sufficient awareness on their roles in the reintegration processes may result in their non-cooperation, and jeopardise peace building initiatives.
- The stigmatization of the victims of insurgency by the affected communities, particularly children and young girls who may have been forcefully recruited as cooks, sex slaves, spies, foot-soldiers and messengers for insurgents may complicate reintegration and make the process more challenging and must be taken into account.

- The failure to address, the pent up anger, repulsion and feelings of hatred on account of the atrocities suffered by host communities makes reintegration tougher than if confronted earlier. Relatedly, the insistence by members of host communities that returnee former VEOs must face retributive justice makes reintegration more complex and must be factored in the engagement of host communities, and might require the employment of transitional justice mechanisms.
- Importantly, the endemic corruption and the continuous exploitation of the political economy of the conflict by a wide range of government actors, make communities wary of the sincerity of government driven reintegration programmes.
- Former VEOs are likely to be ill-treated or discriminated against in communities. Conversely, the community risks grave danger of a multitude of consequences if it hosts former VEOs who are not completely repentant.
- Community policing is important in the aftermath of violent conflict to reduce the risk of organised crime and re-recruitment into violent extremist groups. Communities must contribute to the design of a security management system in partnership with security agencies and non-state security actors based on mutual respect and trust. It is important that the government reviews the national security architecture to enable communities and non-state security actors contribute to the protection of lives and property.

Key Actors for Reintegration

1	National Implementation Committee (The Kukah Centre and ONSA)	To coordinate the implementation strategy of reintegration
2	Local government councils	To partner in ensuring that reintegration is successful in communities
3	Ministry of LG and Chieftaincy affairs	To fund reintegration programmes and activities
4	Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development	Provision of agricultural soft loans and other enablement for agricultural work.
5	Ministry of Works, Power and Housing	Provision of public infrastructure
6	Ministry of Commerce and Industries	Provision of soft loans and other commercial investments

³¹ Rafia Barakat Bhulai, Naureen Chowdhury Fink and Sara Zeiger. “The Roles of Families and Communities in Strengthening Community Resilience Against Violent Extremism”, Published by Hedayah and Global Centre on Cooperative Security, May 2014. retrieved from http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:r3OuM3hoVG8J:www.globalcenter.org/wp-content/uploads/2013/12/MeetingNote_FamiliesandCommunities_FINAL_May2014.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ng, on 08/02/2018.

³² Section 14(2) (b) Constitution of the Federal Republic of Nigeria

³³ Articles 24, 28,

7	Community and Religious Leaders	Mobilizing the grassroots
8	Youths and Women Groups	Influencing implementation of reintegration programmes and activities
9	CSOs and FBOs	Monitoring and evaluation of reintegration activities and programmes as well as support other implementation strategies.
10	SMEDAN	Provision of capital for microfinance businesses
11	Private Sector	Provision of funds for micro-finance businesses
12	International Development Partners	Provision of funds and technical support
13	CBN	Provision of funds for reintegration activities and programmes
14	PINE	Carrying out critical activities that deal with rebuilding livelihood of individuals and communities
15	NEDC	Carrying out critical activities that deal with rebuilding livelihood of individuals and communities

REINTEGRATION OF SPECIAL GROUPS

Children: Within the purview of this DDDR National Framework, “child reintegration” means the process through which children associated with armed groups are transited into civil society and enter meaningful roles and identities as civilians who are accepted by their families and communities within the context of local and national reconciliation. Sustainable reintegration is achieved when the political, legal, economic and social conditions needed for children to maintain life, livelihood and dignity have been secured. This process aims to ensure that children can access their rights, including formal and non-formal education, family unity, dignified livelihoods and safety from harm.³⁴ It needs to be stressed that the process for reintegrating children into civilian life should not stigmatise or make any negative distinction between children who have been recruited or used and those who have not, nor between children who have been recruited or used for temporary, or short periods of time and those who have been recruited or used permanently, or for longer periods of time. It is also detrimental to all conflict-affected children if other vulnerable children who have not been associated with armed forces or armed groups are placed at a disadvantage vis-à-vis those who have been so associated.³⁵

Essential Elements for the Reintegration of Children - The reintegration of children into civilian communities should wherever possible, be carried out in ways that facilitate

local and national reconciliation. It should always be preceded by a risk assessment including a cultural and gender analysis addressing issues of discrimination; and as required under the Child Rights Act 2003, it should be based on the child's best interests, irrespective of national considerations or priorities.

Programmes should build on the resilience of children, enhance self-worth and promote their capacity to protect their own integrity and construct a positive life. Activities should always take into account the age, stage of development and specific needs of each child.

The capacity of the family and community to care for and protect all children affected by conflict should be developed and supported. To achieve this, dialogue with the communities to which children will return, or, be integrated into should be initiated at the earliest possible opportunity. The discussions should explore any fears and prejudices towards returning children, and the potential for stigmatisation of such children. The engagements should be directed at helping communities understand that children have suffered irrespective of their perceived roles in the conflict. They should also share that experience from other conflicts indicate that children can, with appropriate support, integrate effectively into civilian life, and that children are the responsibility of the community as well as the State.

³⁴ The Paris Principles- Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February, 2007.

³⁵ The Paris Principles- Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February, 2007.

The stigmatization of children associated with armed forces or armed groups is one of the greatest barriers to reintegration and girls may be particularly ostracised. Therefore, this has to be avoided and communities must be made to understand that children are primarily victims. It is important to let stakeholders know the necessary linkages between short term humanitarian assistance and longer term development assistance which will enable the reintegration of children.

In order to enable the return and reintegration of children, it is vital to prepare their family and community, and also to provide mediation to support children's return. This is because, children may be reunited or integrated with families and communities that have suffered displacement, disruption, deprivation, and loss of social cohesion as a result of conflict. In view of this, families and communities should:

- * Identify and build upon ways of supporting long term livelihoods within affected areas. Offer economic support to families through income-generating activities provided in such a way that financial incentives are not the main attraction for caring for children.
- * Advocate on behalf of displaced families who are dependent on external support to ensure they receive adequate rations enabling them to support children who are reunited with them. Raise awareness of the problems that may occur when children return, such as aggressive and rebellious behaviour and drug or alcohol use.
- * Emphasize the importance of families showing children they are loved and cared for despite these difficulties. Encourage communities to provide mutual support in dealing with problems and facilitating the formation of constructive social relationships for returning children. Encourage communities to realise that an investment in young people will support the long term peace and security of the community, which may otherwise suffer problems if reintegration is not achieved.

Reintegration of Children with Disabilities and Other Special Needs – Disabled children who are formerly associated with armed group may face isolation and stigma, and be at greater risk of abuse and neglect. They may also be subject to longer term psychosocial distress than children without disability. It is imperative to note that the needs and impact of disability may differ from child to child.

The following principles will assist in ensuring that the needs of children with disability are met:

- * Needs assessments should include questions to highlight the situation of children with disability. The identified needs should be incorporated into ongoing programmes which should be adapted accordingly.
- * Structured activities in the community should be designed to ensure increased social inclusion and mobility of affected children. As such, children with disabilities should be given opportunities to participate in planning and decision on matters that affect them.
- * Advocacy and training activities should target decision makers in communities and government and humanitarian actors to raise awareness of the importance of including disabled children in decision making processes.

Other children that might require special support include those dependent on drug or alcohol abuse, those who have serious health problems, those who have experienced rape or other forms of sexual violence, or those who are traumatised by the atrocities they witnessed or were forced to participate in, as well as those children whose family members cannot be found or who have died, those whose family have rejected them or those who face hostility from their family or community. These children should benefit from a period of intensive psychological or medical support in the community or through a period in residential care or another supported environment. Any such plan should be firmly rooted in the community, involve the family and community, including children, where possible and consistently be aimed at facilitating the child's reintegration.

Reintegration of Girls - The stigma that girls that were associated with armed group(s) face is fundamentally different and much more severe than their male counterparts. It lasts much longer and is critically more difficult to mitigate. Essentially, many girls will have lost their relational “value” as perceived by the community, particularly with regards to marriage. Programmes should seek to establish positive values for the girls in their communities and families. In addition, such girls will often have to deal with residual relationships or feelings for their captors (Stockholm syndrome). For example, the VEO to whom a girl was associated might be both her “husband” and the father of her child or children. In such circumstances, girls should be provided with psychosocial support and consulted about whether they wished to recognise or reject the relationship they had with a member of the armed group or force, or the resultant child(ren).

Certain principles for the reintegration of girls should be considered:

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- * Programmes to assist girls associated with armed forces or armed groups need to strike a careful balance between seeking to identify them in order to ensure their particular needs are met and not stigmatizing them further.
 - * The key to any intervention is to consult with and be led by those affected - many of the listed suggestions have come from girls associated with armed forces or armed groups.³⁶
 - * Extensive community dialogue and mediation is needed to support the reintegration of girls'. Key messages are that girls, especially those who are pregnant or girl mothers need the support of their family and community.
 - * Mainstream strategies that will facilitate girls' acceptance. For example, through steps such as conducting traditional rituals, making reparations, providing health care and livelihoods support, and developing links with women groups.



³⁶ The Paris Principles- Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, February, 2007.

CONNECTING FACTORS FOR DDRR PROGRAMME IN NIGERIA: COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT AND TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Where impunity festers in the aftermath of violent extremist conflicts, they will catalyse memories of accumulated grievances against the State, its institutions and individuals. In addition, they will promote ethno-religious consciousness above and against national identity, fragment families, relationships and communities, thereby conditioning the region for further violence.

Within the context of the foregoing, however, government must not prioritise retributive justice at the expense of community engagement, transitional justice, dialogue and reconciliation; as this is likely to have negative effect on building a resilient post-conflict society. Thus, the end of the conflict presents an opportunity for the government to engage local communities, negotiate peaceful transition, seek reconciliation and construct a collective national identity.

Consequently, in developing a successful DDRR programme in Nigeria, two connecting factors should be considered: *Community Engagement* and *Transitional Justice*. Community Engagement ensures that victims and affected communities are consulted, and that their views become part of the DDRR implementation strategy. Transitional Justice is also necessary to facilitate access to justice, restoration, reconciliation, healing and stability in the communities.

COMMUNITY ENGAGEMENT

Community engagement is often used interchangeably with concepts such as 'involvement' and 'participation', to describe a range of activities and programmes. However, within the context of this document, we adopt the definition

that community engagement is understood as a process of working collaboratively with, and through groups of people affiliated by geographic proximity, special interests, or similar situations to address issues affecting the well-being of those people within and around their communities. It often involves partnerships and coalitions that help mobilize resources and influence systems, change relationships among partners, and serve as catalysts for changing policies, programs and practices³⁷. It therefore means that the goal of community engagement is to build trust, enlist new resources and allies, and create better communication and collaborations. The justification for community engagement is that “people have the inherent capacity to solve their own problems and that social transformation is within the reach of all communities.”³⁸ Engaging a community puts the individuals and the community in greater control of the process and outcomes. They have a better understanding, put forth their ideas, and create a platform for joint problem solving.

Objectives of Community Engagement: The need for community engagement cannot be overemphasized. It is a tool to create broad-base stakeholders' synergy and to articulate a shared vision and mission towards solving problems. It is a means to rebuilding trust among different agencies of interventions. Importantly, it is intended to underscore the views, concerns and initiatives of local communities, incorporate them into the intervention programmes. This will foster community ownership and increase the possibility of successful implementation.

Conditions for Community Engagement: Certain conditions are necessary for facilitating community engagement. There has to be sensitization and awareness creation. Communities must take common ownership of the problem, and accept a shared responsibility for its

³⁷ Center for Disease Control and Prevention (CDC), Principles of Community Engagement Second Edition, 2011, p. 3)

³⁸ W.K Kollon Foundation, Logic Model Development Guide, Michigan, 1998.

success. The role of spoilers must be reduced to the barest minimum. Strategies for mitigating obstacles and role of spoilers must be put in place. There should be a deliberate involvement of champions and stakeholders with credibility. Such stakeholders must demonstrate the willingness to collaborate. The process should be open and credible.

Basic Steps for Community Engagement: Depending on the community and the situation, community engagement formats can vary. However, it must include the following steps as outlined by experts.

1. Group mapping and identification of expected participants
2. Consultation with identified groups and individuals
3. Identification of issues of conflict and differences
4. Identification of group and individual grievances
5. Collation of views on issues and grievances identified
6. Creation of agreed leadership structure that broadly represents all interest groups
7. Agreement on structured deliberation amongst community members and groups
8. Deployment of traditional and modern techniques of reconciliation and reintegration
9. Categorisation of issues and prioritising engagement on each issue identified and agreed upon by parties involved in community engagement.³⁹

Key Actors in Community Engagement

S/N	Identified stakeholder	Role
1	National Implementation Committee (TKC and ONSA)	To coordinate and supervise community engagement
2	Religious leaders	Grassroot mobilisers and influencers
3	Traditional rulers	Grassroot mobilisers and influencers
4	Youth groups	Implementers of key physical decisions
5	Women groups	Trustees of key decisions and issues
6	Local government Area	Mobilizing and facilitating community engagement
7	Ministry of LG and Chieftaincy Affairs	Funding and facilitation
8	State governments	Funding and strategy
9	National Orientation Agency	Influencing attitudinal and positive change
10	CBN	Provision of Funds
11	ONSA	Oversight and supervision of policy direction as well as funding
12	CSOs	Monitoring and evaluation
13	Development partners	Provision of funding and technical expertise
14	Security agency	Provision of security
16	Media	Information dissemination and dialogue platforms

³⁹ Martha, A. Walker. "Community Engagement", retrieved from <http://webcache.googleusercontent.com/search?q=cache:aofRj9g1sfkj:pubs.ext.vt.edu/CV/CV-38/CV-38-PDF.pdf+&cd=1&hl=en&ct=clnk&gl=ng>, on 07/02/2018.

Risks and Emerging Issues on Community Engagement:

The decision to involve or exclude existing spoilers within a particular community is fraught with risks. Mapping and profiling stakeholders to assess their roles and contributions could create suspicion. There is a risk that the DDRR could amplify expectations within local communities. Participants in community engagement may have high expectations including possible financial benefits beyond reconciliation and reintegration. This must be disabused early in the engagement.

TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

Societies in conflict are always faced with the dilemma of dealing with crimes committed and the division created within and between communities. Transitional justice is seen as a response to systematic and/or widespread atrocities, which always entail the violations of human rights. It seeks recognition for victims, and promotes possibilities for peace, reconciliation, and democracy. Transitional justice is not a special form of justice but justice adapted to societies transforming themselves from violence to peace and stability.⁴⁰ At the heart of transitional justice is the understanding of the type of justice to be adopted to achieve peace. Justice has different models: *retributive justice*- which holds that perpetrators must be punished; the *deterrent model of justice* - holds that punishment is necessary to discourage convicts and potential criminals; *restorative justice* - allows perpetrators and victims to rebuild shattered relationships, ensuring that victims' losses are compensated as much as possible; and *formal justice*- refers to the predetermined status and procedures carried out by post-conflict institutions through legal criminal proceedings; and finally, negotiated justice- which includes processes where justice is achieved through communal discussions, debates and agreements.

Approaches to Transitional Justice: There are four approaches to transitional justice.

1. The *maximalist approach* argues for a moral duty to victims and survivors to punish perpetrators which cannot be abrogated for political strategies.⁴¹
2. The *minimalist approach* rejects prosecutions because they could lead to more, not less, violence and instability. While impunity for people who have

committed the gravest acts of inhumanity is morally repugnant, sometimes negotiating with perpetrators is unavoidable and necessary to prevent further conflict and suffering.⁴²

3. The *moderate approach* is a middle way that recognizes the significance of accountability, documents past atrocities and publicly exposes truths of crimes committed. However, it calls for reconciliation between victims and perpetrators.⁴³
4. Finally, the *holistic approach* is the attempt to overcome the limitations of a single approach for building peace. It argues that single approach cannot address the many problems governments in transition encounter after violent conflicts; the number of victims, inadequate legal systems and collapsed infrastructure. It therefore calls for traumatized societies struggling with post conflict reconstruction to adopt multiple transitional justice mechanisms.⁴⁵

Given Nigeria's context and the dynamics of affected communities, this DDRR National Framework advocates for the adoption of the *holistic model*. It envisages that this will be implemented in consultation with the affected communities, and take into consideration options which include alternative dispute resolutions, indigenous justice systems and local structures on ground. There are a number of advantages to employing indigenous justice systems in DDRR settings. The most important benefits are that indigenous justice systems in most Nigerian communities have punitive, reconciliatory, restorative and non-adversarial characteristics all rolled into one. The implication is that indigenous justice processes, which these communities can easily identify with and take ownership of, can make vital contributions to the reintegration of former VEOs into the communities that have been impacted by violence.

Objectives of Transitional Justice within the DDRR National Framework: The core objective of transitional justice within the context of reintegration is to recreate social cohesion which includes both horizontal social capital (linkages between individuals and different groups) and vertical social capital (linkages between citizens and groups and the State and its institutions).⁴⁶ As a matter of fact, social reintegration, as part of the DDRR process, is in part an effort to re-establish trust, rebuild social capital, and restore

⁴⁰ Tricia, D. Olsen et al. 2010. *Transitional Justice in the Balance, Comparing Processes, Weighing Efficacy*. Washington, D.C.: United States Institute of Peace Press, p. :11.

⁴¹ Kathleen D. Moore, 1989, *Pardons: Justice, Mercy, and the Public Interest*, New York: Oxford University Press, p.

⁴² Mark J. Osiel, 2000, *Why Prosecute? Critics of Punishment for Mass Atrocity*, In *Human Rights Quarterly*, 22 (1)

⁴³ Richard J. Goldstone, 1996, *Justice as a Tool for Peace-Making: Truth Commissions and International Criminal Tribunals*, In *New York University Journal of International Law and Politics*, 28 (3):

⁴⁴ Paul van Zyl, 1999, *Dilemmas of Transitional Justice: The Case of South Africa's Truth and Reconciliation Commission*, In *Journal of International Affairs*, 52 (2):21.

⁴⁵ ICTJ, *What is Transitional Justice*

⁴⁶ Nat J. Colletta, Teck Ghee Lim, and Anita Kelles-Viitanen, *Social Cohesion and Conflict Prevention in Asia: Managing Diversity through Development* Washington, DC: The World Bank, 2001, 2-4.

social cohesion between ex-combatants, communities, and the State.⁴⁷ In all of these, transitional justice to secure social capital is cardinal. More so, that social capital is essentially about systems, norms, values, trust, and other social relations that bind communities together and forge links with other communities and the State.

For Transitional Justice to effectively support the DDRR programme, it must adopt a holistic purview which should include investigations, fact-finding processes, mediation, conciliation, negotiation, redress, prosecution, and various kinds of programs for reforms. Again, it should engage impacted communities and create platforms for forgiveness and reconciliation, with the end-objective of preparing such communities for the reintegration of both victims and perpetrators.

Transitional justice mechanism that incorporates local peace building processes is important for various reasons.

First, the weak capacity of state institutions and distrust of 'alien' legal systems are often some of the rationale for engaging indigenous justice systems in transitional contexts. This is in addition to the fact that legal institutions may be unable to cope with the massive numbers of perpetrators, and that indigenous processes may also have a positive developmental impact through its employment of community service as a primary sanction.

Secondly, indigenous justice processes can contribute to transitional justice because their community-based nature may make them more accessible and legitimate than other measures. They are usually located in communities, often encourage the participation of the local population, and draw on existing local practices, structures, and norms.

Thirdly, the DDRR National Framework recommends the use of indigenous justice systems, especially the aspect of truth-telling by both victims and perpetrators of violence. This is because truth telling provides an opportunity for former VEOs to tell their side of the story and make an attempt at amends. In the context of this, there is need to exercise caution on the issue of reparation. The reason is that reparation is very likely to reduce the resentment of victims, however requiring former VEOs to pay compensation runs the risk of becoming a disincentive for VEOs to return thereby frustrating the desire to achieve cohesion in society. The truth telling sessions should be presided over by reputable community members in a dignified manner.

Principles for Transitional Justice in DDRR National Framework: To ensure that transitional justice successfully supports the DDRR National Framework, it should provide victims with a sense of justice. It should also create a public forum for the judicial confirmation of facts which should erase the dangerous culture of collective guilt. It should lay bare the truth about violations of the past and condemn

them. It should give societies the opportunity to re-examine the fundamental principles of the rule of law. Reconciliation and restorative justice should not stand in the way of retributive justice for those who have committed serious crimes. This will help end the culture of impunity. Resources dedicated to trials and prosecutions should not be prioritised over and above the plight of victims and the neglect of post-conflict reconstruction. Prosecutions should include judicial reforms and avoid provoking rebellions that lead to further massacre and weakening of the civilian governments. Reconciliation, negotiations and amnesties should balance political bargains, and make peace and stability possible.

Risks and Emerging Issues on Transitional Justice:

- The call to use traditional structures and local dispute resolution mechanisms are fraught with risks. They are likely to evoke past conflict and memories of violence that have remained unresolved.
- The attempt to over-rely on restorative justice, forgiveness and reconciliation stands the risk of promoting the culture of impunity and failing to address the sense of injustice among victims. This will likely lead to absence of collective ownership of the intervention, as well as reprisal attacks.
- The use of local justice processes portends the risk of reinforcing gender bias or other biases embedded in local practices and structures.
- Again, one of the most common concerns about local justice processes is that, since they can operate outside formal legal systems and sometimes outside state control, they do not always respect national or international legal or human rights standards.
- Local processes may not be appropriate for dealing with serious human rights violations. The reason is that most local justice processes were originally intended to deal with civil conflicts between family and community members, not violent crimes.
- There is also need to create a database of losses incurred during violent conflict and compensation provided to victims as reparations for atrocities committed against them. The mechanisms that would administer a fund to facilitate this process should be developed by a multi-stakeholder platform that includes representatives of the victims, civil society organisations, international development partners and government representatives.
- It is important that a body backed by law to support victims of violent conflicts in different parts of the country is established to ensure that reparations for victims of violent conflict in a long term and sustainable process. Presently, the Victim Support Fund only supports victims of the Boko Haram insurgency.

⁴⁷ Ian Douglas et al, Disarmament, Demobilisation and Reintegration: A Practical Field and Classroom Guide (Frankfurt: German Agency for Technical Cooperation, Norwegian Defence International Centre, Pearson Peacekeeping Centre, Swedish National Defence College, 2000

MAINSTREAMING SPECIAL GROUPS WITHIN THE DDRR PROCESS

While there is no general definition for what should consist of 'special groups', they are generally considered to be persons with peculiar vulnerabilities, or with distinctive needs, or needing extraordinary attention, exclusive of the general group. Commonly accepted definitions of special groups will include “women, children, incapacitated or disabled persons (physical and mental), and the aged”. In this National Framework on DDRR, special groups refer to those with peculiar needs and demand extraordinary attention and care. They are those who are vulnerable and could be exploited, if not protected. These category of persons include children, women, the physically challenged as well as those who are mentally ill.

The Legal Framework

The Addendum to the Rome Memorandum on the Global Terrorism Forum Good in Practice Number 2 recommends that, “States should ensure that their legal frameworks allow for targeted and tailored rehabilitation and reintegration efforts for special categories of individuals.” The existing legal framework and best practices for special groups are enumerated below for each of the groups identified.

Children

Children are protected from recruitment and use by armed forces and groups under international humanitarian law and international human rights law. International and regional instruments such as the Optional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions and the Additional Protocols, the Convention on the Rights of the Child, the Rome Statute establishing the International Criminal Court, and the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child, offer a legal framework for the protection of children.

Distinguishing Children - There are several categories of children in the DDRR process and sometimes, distinctions

need to be made in their treatment. For instance, children associated with armed groups will require a distinct set of rules while orphans, vulnerable and internally displaced children will also require another set of safeguards. However, in all, certain laws will be generally applicable to both groups. Children associated with armed groups should ideally be inducted into special programmes within the demobilization and deradicalisation programme, while the other categories of children will only be involved within the reintegration and rehabilitation phases.

Children associated with armed groups, often referred to as Child Soldiers. The *Cape Town Principles and Best Practices (1997)* defines a *child soldier* as “any person under 18 years of age who is part of any kind of regular or irregular armed force or armed group in any capacity, included but not limited to: cooks, porters, messengers and anyone accompanying such groups other than purely as family members. The definition includes girls recruited for sexual purposes and forced marriage. It does not therefore only refer to a child who is carrying or has carried arms.” The term “*children associated with armed groups or forces*” is now used to avoid the perception that the only children of concern are combatant boys.

Children not associated with armed groups or forces will refer to all other categories of children. Special attention should however be paid to orphans and vulnerable children. In engaging all categories of children within the DDRR programmes, it is recommended that a set of guiding principles from the UN Convention on the Rights of the Child, ratified by 196 countries including Nigeria be applied at all times, and at all stages: from conflict analysis and detailed assessments through the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation.

⁴⁸ 14th Bruges Colloquium – October 7th and 8th 2013. Keynote Address Ms. Christine Beerli, ICRC vice president

Guiding principles	Meaning
The child's right to life, survival and development ⁴⁹	The right to life, survival and development is not limited to physical integrity, but includes the need to ensure full and harmonious development, including at the spiritual, moral and social levels, where education plays a key role
Non-discrimination ⁵⁰	States must ensure respect for the rights of all children within their jurisdiction – including non-national children – regardless of race, sex, age, religion, ethnicity, opinions, disability or any other status of the child, or of the child's parents or legal guardians.
Child participation ⁵¹	Children should be allowed to express their opinions freely, and those opinions should be "given due weight in accordance with the age and maturity of the child". Children should be consulted at all stages of the demobilization and reintegration process. In particular, children should participate in making decisions with regard to family reunification, and vocational and educational opportunities.
Best interest of the child ⁵²	Actions that affect the child should be based on an assessment of whether those actions are in the child's best interests.

Other critical international instruments for engaging children within the DDDR process are enumerated below:

- * Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV),
- * Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of international armed conflicts (Protocol I),
- * Additional Protocol to the Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949, and relating to the protection of victims of non-international armed conflicts (Protocol II),
- * African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child (ACRWC),
- * Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court (Rome Statute),
- * Convention concerning the Prohibition and Immediate Action for the Elimination of the Worst Forms of Child Labour (ILO Convention 182),
- * Optional Protocol to the Convention on the Rights of the Child on the involvement of children in armed conflict (OPAC),
- * Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups (Paris Principles),

One of the most important documents is the Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or

Armed Groups otherwise known as the Paris Principles. The Paris Principles build on global experiences on implementing programmatic interventions to prevent recruitment, protect children, support their release from armed forces or armed groups and reintegrate them into civilian life. They recommend that:

- * Geneva Convention relative to the Protection of Civilian Persons in Time of War (Geneva Convention IV) should be applied at all times;
- * Given that contexts will vary, a situation analysis, including a gender analysis, should inform and guide all interventions;
- * Programs should address the needs of all children affected by armed conflict and incorporate activities to develop and support local capacity to provide a protective environment for children;
- * The protective environment should integrate special measures to prevent discrimination against girls associated with armed groups and to promote their equal status in society;
- * There must be a long term commitment by all stakeholders to prevent the unlawful recruitment or use of children, promote their release from armed forces or armed groups, protect them and support their reintegration;
- * The family including the extended family and clan and the community should be actively incorporated in the

⁴⁹ Article 6 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

⁵⁰ Article 2 (2) UN Convention on the Rights of the Child,

⁵¹ Articles 12, 13, 14 and 15 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

⁵² Articles 20, 21 UN Convention on the Rights of the Child

development and implementation of interventions and activities.⁵³

The Response: Child-specific DDDR programmes are significantly different from adult DDDR programmes, and have a different scope and time-frame. Children within the contexts of demobilization and deradicalisation should be separated from adult combatants, and should receive assistance specifically designed for their needs.

Demobilization and Deradicalisation of Children

The framework for demobilization (and disarmament) and deradicalisation (positive behavioural change) of children must pay special attention to prevention of recruitment. The Cape Town Principles⁵⁴ recommend a mapping of children most vulnerable to recruitment: children caught up in conflict areas, children (especially adolescents) separated from or without families, institutionalized children; other marginalized groups (e.g. street children, minorities, refugees and IDPs, economically and socially deprived children); and the development of prevention programming aimed at giving dedicated attention to them.

Children should be prioritised in all demobilization and deradicalisation programmes. These programmes must respect their dignity, maintain their confidentiality and enfranchise them throughout the process. The demobilization of children must also be structured in a manner that will not occasion their exposure/interview in the presence of their superiors or peers. The demobilization of children should be a multi-agency endeavour to ensure the protection of their best interest at all times. Their health must be prioritized and health screenings/interventions should be carried out very early in the process. In the same vein, tracing of families to which they can be reunited with must start early in the demobilization process.

Reintegration of Children

Child reintegration, as defined by the Paris Principles, is “the process through which children transition into civil society and enter meaningful roles and identities as civilians who are accepted by their families and communities in a context of local and national reconciliation”.⁵⁵ While the best interests of the child⁵⁶ shall be the primary consideration, programming has largely been organized around five core programming components outlined by the Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards (IDDRS) 2006⁵⁷: psychosocial support and care; community acceptance; education, training and livelihood;

inclusive programming for all war affected children; and follow up and monitoring.

Psychosocial support and care is an important part of the reintegration process, given the mental health issues (e.g., behavioural changes and psychological trauma) that children suffer as a consequence of their time with armed groups. This should start during the release process and should be implemented at “all stages of reintegration programming” to support children and their families and communities in developing “their strengths and resilience” and actively engaging them in their own recovery.⁵⁸

Age appropriate programming taking into account the age of association

Family reunification and community acceptance are two of the most important aspects of children's reintegration. The implementation ranges from preparatory work for family and communities to family-tracing programme and -restoring family Links.

Community-based resources must be utilized to ensure sustainable support for demobilized children, and it is important to point out that there is a rich landscape of bottom-up local programming within which communities deal with reintegration processes. Education and vocational training start from the assumption that the likelihood of successful reintegration to civilian life is increased by education and job opportunities. Its aim is to ensure that all released children have access to schools and other learning facilities appropriate to their age and level of education.

Reintegration programmes are more effective if they are community-based, community-driven, and inclusive

An inclusive approach that supports all war-affected children is a core component of child reintegration programmes. Programmes narrowly targeted to formerly associated children can cause further polarization and stigmatization, as well as envy and anger from victims and war-affected communities over demobilisation benefits. Community-oriented reintegration efforts can help strike a balance between the community's interests and the need to

⁵³ Article 1.7 (Overview of the the Paris Principles)

⁵⁴ Article 9

⁵⁵ The Paris Principles: Principles and Guidelines on Children Associated with Armed Forces or Armed Groups, Article 2.8 (February 2007), p. 7. Available from www.unicef.org/emerg/files/ParisPrinciples310107English.pdf.

⁵⁶ Convention on the Rights of the Child, article 3 (1).

⁵⁷ Module 5.30. Children and DDR. Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.” (United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 2006), p. 1.

⁵⁸ The Paris Principles, p. 7.

support formerly associated children, and foster a feeling of inclusion.⁵⁹ Reintegration programmes should invest in services and infrastructure that benefit the whole community, such as building and staffing schools or livelihood projects in the community.

Programmes that are **anchored in local structures and traditions**, as they can help facilitate children's reintegration into families and communities.

Follow-up and or monitoring activities by professional social workers should be carried out to monitor the living conditions of demobilized children, the quality of their relationship with family members and the level of their reintegration into the community, and will allow mediation of disputes when necessary. This system must also ensure that they do not suffer reprisal attacks or prejudice in their communities, and that their best interest is protected at all times.

Prosecution of Children: Principle of the Best Interest of the Child: Within the context of demobilization, there is the need for former combatants to also be processed through the justice system. The process must however take into cognizance that children who were under the age of 18 as at the time that they committed war crimes do not come within the purview of the Roman Statute or the International Criminal Court. The Paris Principles mandates that they must rather be treated in accordance with international standards for juvenile justice. Of particular application would be Article 17 of the African Charter on the Rights and Welfare of the Child; which mandates that the main objective for processing children through the judicial system must be for their reformation and re-integration into their family and social rehabilitation. It is therefore pertinent that mechanisms for accountability involving children associated with armed forces or groups shall occur within a framework of restorative justice that guarantees the psychological and social rehabilitation of the child, and shall be carried out in accordance with the provisions of the Convention on the Rights of the Child and other international standards for juvenile justice.⁶⁰

There should not be a largely punitive or national security approach when it comes to children formerly associated to armed groups this is because:

- * Imprisonment reinforces perception of the 'enemy' and feelings of injustice.
- * Harsh treatment in detention can fuel additional grievances.

- * Incarcerating associated children with violent, criminal, or ideological individuals may actually help foster future engagement with armed groups

Applying the best interest of the child principle should be primary consideration in all decision making processes regarding children associated to armed groups or forces. Standard operating procedures that seek to reconcile human rights and security concerns should be adopted. Article 8.10 of the Paris Principles also advises that where large numbers of people are facing criminal proceedings as a result of armed conflict, the processing the cases of children, and of mothers who have children with them in detention should take priority.

Women in Armed Conflict

The roles of women in conflict are often very complex ones. While many are abducted or coerced, some are freewill supporters, or dependants of combatants who may or may not be in support of their cause, and may or may not directly participate in conflict. Women and girls rarely ever fulfil just one role. For instance, a woman coerced into conflict may all at once be: a cook, a spy, sexual slave and eventually – a suicide bomber. Some women originally coerced into conflict may become staunch supporters, or even develop strong emotional ties (Stockholm syndrome) to their abductors. Whether in support or coerced into conflict, returnee women and girls are more likely to be stigmatized alongside children they might have bore in captivity. Many will return to become heads of households themselves and will need to develop some level of financial independence in order to be resilient. The sexual and gender based violence they might have suffered will also require psychosocial support; and in the instance that they return with unwanted pregnancies or children born in captivity, they will require a battery of support should they decide to keep or not to keep such children. Within the DDRR process, these complexities need to be carefully factored into interventions. Alongside these complexities are the added gender nuances that must be considered essential for effective programming. The DDRR programme must therefore make every effort to remove obstacles for former women combatants and other women associated with armed groups from participating in them.

Categories of Women in Armed Conflict

Female Combatants: These are women and girls who participated in armed conflicts as active combatants using arms.

Female Supporters/Associates of Armed Forces and Groups (FAAFGs): These are women who participated in armed conflicts in supportive roles, whether coerced or voluntarily. They are economically and socially dependent on the armed force or group for their income and social support. Examples: porters, cooks, nurses, spies,

⁶⁰ Example: the one-plus-one” targeting principle in South Sudan: for each released child, another at risk of recruitment is inducted into the programme

administrators, translators, radio operators, medical assistants, public information workers, camp leaders or women used for sexual exploitation.

Female Dependants: They are women and girls who are part of ex-combatants' households. These are primarily socially and financially dependent on ex-combatants, although they may also have retained other community ties. Examples are wives/war wives, children, mothers/parents, female siblings and female members of the extended family.

Female Abductees: These are women and girls who are coerced to serve combatants providing support services such as cooking, spying, taking part in hostilities, suicide bombing, medical care, sexual servitude or forced marriage. Many become dependent on the armed group for support or sustenance.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATIONALISING GENDER IN THE DDRR FRAMEWORK

United Nations Security Council Resolutions 1325 and 2122 amongst other resolutions⁶¹ call for the systematic engagement and participation of women in conflict prevention, resolution and peacebuilding. The Protocol to the African Charter on Human and Peoples' Rights on the Rights of Women in Africa (2003, also known as the Maputo Protocol) reiterates this call in its Articles 10.2 (b) and (e).⁶² The Security Council also admonishes states “to consider the different needs of female and male ex-combatants and to take into account the needs of their dependents.”⁶³

Within the AU framework, several other instruments that instruct member parties on the framework to adopt to ensure the equitable treatment of women and girls within the DDRR framework include:

- * Constitutive Act of the AU (2000).
- * Solemn Declaration on Gender Equality in Africa (2004).
- * Solemn Declaration on a Common African Defence and Security Policy (2004).
- * Policy on Post-Conflict Reconstruction and Development (2006).
- * AU Gender Policy (2008).

⁶¹ resolutions 1820 (2008), 1888 (2009), 1889 (2009), 2106 (2013)v and 2122 (2013)

⁶² Articles 10.2 (b) and (e)

⁶³ Art. 13UNSCR 1325 (2000)

⁶⁴ Module 5.10. Women, Gender and DDR. Integrated Disarmament, Demobilization and Reintegration Standards.” (United Nations Inter-Agency Working Group on DDR, 2006), p. 1.

- * African Women's Decade: 2010-2020.
- * Roadmap for the African Women's Decade: 2010-2020.
- * Fund for African Women (2011).
- * The New Partnership for Africa's Development (NEPAD) Spanish Fund for African Women's Empowerment (2007).
- * AU assembly decisions on gender equality and women's empowerment.

The African Union Operational Guideline on DDRR for Women advises the incorporation of Gender-Aware Interventions, and Female-Specific Interventions. The guideline explains them as: *Gender-Aware Interventions:* These deal with both men's and women's issues e.g. assessing the different life choices made by women as opposed to men, or general security concerns; and *Female-Specific Interventions:* These deal with the specific needs of women so that they benefit from DDRR programmes to the same extent as men.

Gender-Aware Interventions Vs. Female-Specific Interventions

DDRR programmes should include interventions that fall into the following two categories:

- * **Gender-Aware Interventions:** These deal with both men's and women's issues in overall DDRR-related activities, such as assessing the different life choices made by women as opposed to men and boys, security concerns or a fear of exposure or re-exposure to SGBV.
- * **Female-Specific Interventions:** These are designed to deal with the specific needs of women so that they benefit from DDRR programmes to the same extent as men, such as taking into account the different roles other than combatant that females may have fulfilled.

Gender Responsiveness in Demobilization and Deradicalisation

A gender-responsive demobilization process should avoid reinforcing existing inequalities between men and women or making economic hardship worse for female combatants, supporters and dependants. The table below gives guidelines as to the gender and female-specific interventions in the demobilization process.⁶⁴

Gender Aware Interventions

Female Specific Interventions

Cantonment and mobile demobilization

Ensure registration forms and questionnaires are designed to supply sex disaggregated data on groups.	Make provision for women's specific health needs, including reproductive needs (remember items such as re-usable sanitary napkins, etc.).
Ensure a balance of men and women among staff.	Consider assembling testimonies of SGBV during conflict and establishing links between the DDRR process and the justice system to prosecute perpetrators of sexual abuse of women
Provide psychosocial support to men, women, boys and girls affected by SGBV during conflict.	Ensure that reproductive health care services are available to female victims of SGBV.
Allow for privacy in accordance with culturally accepted norms when designing sanitary facilities.	Ensure that support is available to women and girls who are HIV-positive, as well as to women and girls heading households where HIV-positive ex-combatants may be living.
Include separate facilities for women, men, girls and boys, as required.	Ensure that mothers who are combatants and those associated with armed forces and groups will not be separated from their children during demobilization.
Offer men, women, boys and girls equal (but, if necessary, separate) access to education about HIV/AIDS, including voluntary counselling and testing, and other health services and supplies.	

Gender Aware Interventions

Female Specific Interventions

Transitional support

Prepare transitional support carefully to avoid reinforcing negative gender stereotypes.	Take into account female spending patterns and needs when designing cash assistance.
Ensure that transitional support deals with the different needs of male and female ex-combatants and supporters.	Take into account women's traditional forms of money management (e.g. rotational loan and credit schemes).
Ensure that male and female ex-combatants have equal access to individual benefits (HIV/AIDS services and support, land, tools, training and financial assistance).	
Anticipate opportunities for women's economic independence as well as potential drawbacks for women entering previously 'male' workplaces and professions.	

Gender Aware Interventions	Female Specific Interventions
Resettlement	
Make sure male and female supporters and dependants are included in any travel assistance that is offered to male ex-combatants	Cater for the needs of women and girls and their children on their journey back to the community.
Ensure female and male ex-combatants, supporters and dependants are free to choose their areas of return	Take measures to reunify mothers and children.
	Take measures to minimize the exposure of women and girls to SGBV, re-recruitment and abduction into armed forces and groups, and human trafficking

Gender Responsiveness in Reintegration

Specific interventions are necessary to make easier the access of women and girls to social and economic reintegration opportunities on an equal basis with men and boys. The table below outlines interventions that should inform and/or become an integral part of socioeconomic reintegration programmes:

Gender Aware Interventions	Female Specific Interventions
Provide physical and psychosocial rehabilitation to disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants so that they do not become a burden for women and girls.	Allocate resources to train female ex-combatants, supporters, dependents and community members on how to care for and cope with children traumatized by conflict.
Take into account specific gender dynamics related to access to land and housing, particularly when traditional practices and legal systems do not accommodate female headed households or women's land ownership.	Ensure education and training are designed for the needs of women and girls.
Assess the extent to which the production of crops and animal husbandry are divided among household members according to gender and age.	View women's access to credit and capital as a positive investment in reconstruction, since they have an established record of high rates of return.
Prevent the marginalization of women ex-combatants, supporters and dependants, and war widows, and provide them with assistance.	Support and build the capacity of women's organizations to participate in healing and reconciliation initiatives
Support the transformation of violent masculine identities into non-violent violent ones through information, sensitization and counselling.	Encourage community mental health practices.
	Encourage the establishment of formal/ informal self-help groups among female ex-combatants and supporters.
	Allocate funding for child care, and make the necessary arrangements to allow women and girls to take part in training (e.g. organize training as close as possible to where they live).
	Give women and girls a voice in determining the types of marketable vocational skills they should acquire.

Gender Aware Interventions	Female Specific Interventions
	Assist women to build their houses, considering that they usually work from home in self-employment activities
	Take measures to ensure widows of ex-combatants and single women ex-combatants and supporters are recognized as heads of households, and are therefore permitted to own and rent existing housing and land.
	Support women to farm cash crops and raise livestock, as opposed to only engaging in subsistence agriculture
	Support women in having equal access to communally owned farm implements and water-pumping equipment, and to own such equipment.

THE ELDERLY, CHRONICALLY ILL, AND PERSONS WITH PHYSICAL OR MENTAL INCAPACITY

It is important to take special measures to meet the specific needs of elderly, chronically ill, physically or mentally incapacitated participants in the DDDR process. They have special needs and require special care. Throughout the DDDR process, it is essential to systematically factor in the needs of these groups which, by their nature, have different requirements and call for different types of intervention. The process must ensure that it does not adopt a charity outlook, which emphasizes the helplessness of disabled people and assumes a need for paternalistic care. Rather it should adopt a social, or independent living, model of disability, which empowers, enfranchises and is inclusive for people with disabilities.

LEGAL FRAMEWORK FOR OPERATIONALISING PHYSICALLY AND MENTALLY VULNERABLE PERSONS IN THE DDDR FRAMEWORK

Several international and regional instruments allude to the inclusion of the foregoing class of persons, they include:

- * The UN Standard Rules on the Equalization of Opportunities for Persons with Disabilities,
- * The UN Convention on the Rights of the Child (Articles 2 and 23),

- * The ILO Convention No.159 concerning the Vocational Rehabilitation and Employment of Disabled Persons and the associated Recommendation No. 168,
- * The UNESCO Salamanca Statement and Framework for Action 'Education for All', on Special Needs Education,
- * The WHO Declaration of Alma-Ata establishing rehabilitative care as part of primary health care,
- * The Beijing Platform for Action for the Advancement of Women (paragraphs 60, 82, 175, 178, 232). and
- * The African Decade of Persons with Disabilities,
- * The Convention on the Rights of Persons with Disabilities (CRPD)

Demobilization and Deradicalisation: Consideration for this class of participants must be taken when designing the environment and program for demobilization and custodial deradicalisation. The intake screening process in demobilization should systematically integrate a health and disability screening upon arrival at the camp. This system should categorize disabled and chronically ill ex-combatants by developing a Disability Assessment Index, to benchmark all disabilities and rates them. This process will assist in creating parameters for accessing specific programs aimed at assisting vulnerable participants.

Participants with medical conditions, especially, with HIV and Hepatitis B should also receive counselling and be mainstreamed into treatment cohorts. Psychological incapacitation is also a common phenomenon in conflict

and post conflict and must be factored in all stages of DDRR programming. Medical facilities screening should be provided at demobilization and deradicalisation intake, with periodic checks throughout the DDRR process.

Rehabilitation and Reintegration: Special consideration must be given to the social, political and economic rehabilitation of persons within this category. Given the sharp increase in disabilities and chronic illnesses that conflicts occasion, it is imperative that national and regional laws and policies to protect and ensure the equitable treatment of this category of persons are enacted. Human resources and institutional capacity must also be systematically built to respond to their needs in a sustainable manner.

Two core objectives must guide the reintegration and

rehabilitation of this category of participants:

- * Ensure that they are able to maximize their physical and mental abilities, to access regular services and opportunities, and to become active contributors to the community and society at large; and,
- * To catalyse their communities to promote and protect their human rights by removing barriers to participation in community life.

Education, job counselling, skills development, micro-enterprise support schemes, rural development activities and employment promotion activities must therefore fit within the local contexts of the communities within which they are being rehabilitated.

CONCLUSION

The DDRR National Framework addresses the issues of transition to peace in Nigeria in a way and manner not provided for in the National CVE Action Plan. Following the security strategies adopted by the government, including back-channelled negotiations and humanitarian response, stability and peaceful transition continues to elude the Northeast. The future of the current conflict remains uncertain and therefore calls for adequate policy responses in terms of peace building strategies. As such, the DDRR Framework is designed to address the Demobilisation, Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and eventual Reintegration of perpetrators and victims in affected communities. The framework is accompanied by an implementation strategy and a policy document that guides the process of this implementation.

The implementation of the DDRR Framework should be supported by a political will on the side of the government. International development partners should assist with capacity development and the assembling of requisite


expertise. Local communities should be open to the project and take ownership; understanding their roles in the implementation processes. Importantly, community engagement and a holistic form of transitional justice remains central to the DDRR project. Nigerians know that religious extremism is not just an academic concept; it is a reality on which violence feeds and grows. It is not certain whether massive economic turnaround is likely to reduce the possibilities for violence in Nigeria. What is certain is that the ongoing violence in the Northeast is a clarion call for Nigeria and Nigerians to begin to assert clearly the supremacy of citizenship over and above other sectional claims. Nigeria's young and struggling democracy may stumble and fall, but Nigerians must renew their commitment to the fine principles and challenges of building a democratic culture on the foundations of a secular, free and just society.



Part TWO

IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGY FOR

**DEMOBILISATION,
DERADICALISATION,
REHABILITATION AND
REINTEGRATION**



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INTRODUCTION

This Policy Implementation Strategy is intended to be used as a guide to operationalise the Demobilisation, Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) Framework which is expected to contribute to post conflict recovery, stability and reintegration in environments characterized by violent extremism across Nigeria. The Policy Implementation strategy is an important guide that can help the Nigerian government, policy makers, key decision makers, civil society groups, international development partners and government agencies to understand their roles and responsibilities in the implementation of the Framework. It is important that these stakeholders work together to address the issues of rehabilitation and reintegration of both victims and perpetrators of the conflict in the North East. This includes addressing the needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children, youth and persons living with disabilities, who have been affected by violent conflict. This guide provides a holistic programmatic strategy that shows how the different components of the DDRR Framework are interdependent and the risks associated with implementation in a society that is still grappling with political, social, economic and environmental challenges. It is intended to be people-centric, gender sensitive and contextually relevant with adherence to national and international standards and laws, in line with the implementation of similar DDRR frameworks in other climes. Institutional reforms particularly those that promote the rule of law and improve security are crucial to the success of the DDRR Framework. Security Sector Reform that integrates and streamlines the roles and responsibilities of non-state security actors in security provisioning should be considered to improve and facilitate community policing.

Violent extremism in Nigeria is a multi-dimensional phenomenon which has been caused, triggered or enabled by a complex web of ethno-religious, historical, regional, political, socio-economic, environmental and legal

challenges that reinforce one another because they have been left unaddressed. These factors remain a significant risk to the operationalization of the DDRR Framework. Therefore, strategies must be developed by key stakeholders to mitigate against such risks to aid post conflict recovery and stability. One of such strategies is the need for community engagement. It is a strategy that is integral to the design, monitoring and successful implementation of the DDRR Framework. This would foster community ownership, build social capital, promote social cohesion and empower communities to adopt strategies that can contribute to long term peace and stability within the North East region.

However, most of the agencies and international development actors currently involved in countering violent extremism programmes lack coordination and a central operational guide. This challenge presents an opportunity to use the guide in the design, implementation, monitoring and evaluation of demobilization, deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration programmes in North East Nigeria; where a plethora of development and humanitarian assistance continues to contribute to post-insurgency recovery.

2. DEMOBILISATION

2.1 Description

Demobilization is both a physical and mental process. As noted in the DDRR National Framework, it is the formal and controlled discharge of active combatants from the armed forces or other armed groups. It is made up of three processes: disarmament, classification and demobilisation. In this context, disengaging from violence is at the core of demobilization, and is the physical act that needs to occur before deradicalization, which in itself is a mental change. Therefore, while disarmament is the withdrawal or reduction of weapons that is integral part of demobilization, it is incomplete without the mental disengagement from violence. In order for DDRR to be successful, both the physical and mental processes of demobilization must take place. However, these concepts do not follow a linear process as DDRR is a continuum. While the process for demobilization in Nigeria's DDRR program is clearly alluded to and even practiced, there is no clearly delineated procedure for its practice. As it stands, 'surrendered combatants' are screened by *Operation Lafia Dole* and then processed on to *Operation Safe Corridor*. While *Operation Safe Corridor* in itself is yet to have a legal framework to justify its operations, it has nevertheless provided critical structures for a demobilization process. It therefore means that *Operation Safe Corridor* should be developed and integrated into the legal and policy framework for DDRR such that it can be replicated in any internal conflict in Nigeria.

The current demobilization process is mostly militarized and overwhelmingly focuses on Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs) and the Civilian Joint Task Force (CJTF). This process should be extended to include a comprehensive programme on community engagement that considers a role for communities and families in the DDRR programme:

- * The involvement of community and family leadership can foster trust in the community; thereby, making it easy for the government agencies involved in

demobilization to undertake the process. Communities should run independent and close-knit sensitization campaigns to educate members on the dangers of small arms proliferation.

- * This is especially important for less formal/structured arms bearers (combatants and CJTF). In instances where women and children have served as custodians of weapons, trust in the demobilization process will encourage this group to turn in arms. In another example, CJTF members have been given the (informal) mandate to retrieve weapons from fallen combatants. Whereas official arms issued to CJTF can be tracked, these 'spoils of war' are sometimes withheld by the CJTF. Community and family involvement can provide local intelligence that is likely to facilitate retrieval of these weapons.
- * Communities can also organize anonymous retrieval/returns processes to help cushion fears of direct involvement with the militarized structure of demobilization.
- * Communities can help identify and verify families that engaged in traditional hunting as trade in order to aid the screening process involved in administering gun licenses.

2.2 Core Principles for Demobilization Process

All activities by identified actors must be guided by commitment to:

- * Equal treatment and non-discrimination
- * Respect for human rights
- * Human and community security
- * Inter-agency cooperation and collaboration
- * Transparency and accountability
- * Gender and cultural sensitivity

- * Services of Experts
- * Training and Capacity Development

2.3 Target Groups

It is essential that the scope for the demobilization programme is not limited to former insurgent combatants, but is inclusive of groups such as hunters, vigilante groups, CJTF, compromised security personnel and other non-state armed groups. Men, women and children mostly, dependants of VEOs who may not have engaged in traditional armed combat, and therefore have no weapon to turn in, but have been engaged in other acts that support violence, should be considered for participation in the process.

2.4 Actions

Given the circumstances of the demobilization, which includes disarmament or disengagement, individuals should be camped at clearly designated sites. The core consideration for the location of processing camps should be security and ease of access to all other DDDR processes and personnel. Demobilization camps must also be designed and equipped in a manner that accords dignity to all participants. Importantly, therefore, they must not be crowded and social amenities must be provided. For example, a camp with an estimated size of 900M sq should accommodate an average of 600 persons. The design of these camps must also be gender sensitive, and must be cognizant of the special needs of persons with disability, mentally impaired persons, women and children. In the context of the Boko Haram conflict, demobilization activity should be taken at three levels:

- * **Disarmament:** This indicates the collection, documentation, control and disposal of small arms, ammunition, explosives and light and heavy weapons of combatants and often also of the civilian population. Disarmament also includes the development of responsible arms management programmes.
- * **Classification:** It is the classification or verification of ex-combatants who have been disarmed. This means processing individuals to determine their motivations and their ideological commitment to the group, as well as assessing the level of risk they may pose to society. This kind of profiling tells how the ex-combatant could be handled.
- * **Transition to De-radicalisation:** Disarmed ex-combatants and individuals associated with the group are divided into different categories according to level of involvement. Some are sent to designated facilities for rehabilitation while others are processed through the criminal justice system.

There are various levels of conflicts ongoing in different parts of the country. Any form of demobilisation should

therefore give priority to the three levels mentioned above: disarmament, classification and transition to de-radicalisation.

2.4.1 Screening Process:

It is important to mention that demobilisation includes an intensive screening process. Thus, after disarmament, all participants should be screened and documented. Procedure for this exercise should include obtaining their bio-data, DNAs, conducting physical and health screening and certification, and performing background checks. In addition, participants should be interviewed to provide essential information. Upon completion of the process participants should be briefed on the ground rules and the system for engagement. The database of all participants must be fed into a purpose specific secure centralized information management system managed by the Office of the National Security Adviser to ease facilitation throughout the Demobilisation, Disarmament, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) process.

2.5 Key Actors

Demobilization is a multi-sectoral process that requires inter-agency coordination and effective oversight and management. It is essential that an agency for Disarmament and Demobilization be established with legal status, under the supervision of the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA). The Agency would work with other government departments whose activities are delineated with demobilization as outlined below:

- * **Security agencies:** The military and the police would be responsible for the disarmament process to ensure that weapons' survey is conducted to determine how weapons will be retrieved, stored and destroyed. A security and monitoring mechanism that protects retrieved weapons should be put in place to avoid trafficking and recycling of these weapons back into the hands of the insurgents. The security agencies should provide proper documentation and evidence on each disarmed individual that will facilitate the process of DDDR.
- * **Ex-combatants:** They need to voluntarily hand in all weapons where they exist and subject themselves to screening and profiling. They must provide accurate information about the extent to which they have been involved in violent conflict, their motivations and areas of operations. Additional information should be provided on strategies and tactics used, including abductions, organized crime; and the use of stimulants such as drugs to enable agencies responsible decide the type of programme they will be required to participate in.

- * **Impacted communities and families:** Communities and family members can participate in demobilization exercises by providing background information on ex-combatants from their communities, including the conditions that facilitated their radicalisation and participation in violent activities. They should also provide local intelligence on proliferation of small arms; family members, relatives and community members should be involved in persuading ex-combatants to surrender to the Government and hand in their weapons to authorities.
- * **State governments:** They need to work with the Office of the National Security Adviser to understand the DDDR National Framework and Action plan in order to support the demobilization process in various states. This can be better coordinated by establishing a state commission on DDDR - made up of members from the various LGAs. They could also get involved in monitoring the impact of the exercise and provide feedback to the Federal Government as and when necessary.
- * **Local Government Area Councils:** This level of government is the closest to the communities and it is important they contribute to the design and implementation of disarmament and demobilization programme. They may be required to provide resources and other types of support to ensure the programmes are successful. They should help in coordinating the role of community and family members in the entire process.
- * **Non-Governmental Organizations:** NGOs play a crucial role in demobilization camps as they can provide technical expertise in psycho-social support and rehabilitation of drug users. They can also sensitize communities about the disarmament and demobilization process to support the government in planning these exercises. Additionally, they should provide ongoing training and capacity building for those directly involved in the demobilization process.
- * **Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development:** The ministry can support the demobilization of women and children who may have been involved in violent conflict. The gender sensitive nature of the context requires that the ministry takes charge in profiling women and children. They may have provided support to violent extremist groups without bearing arms – they would still need to demobilize to ensure that they are no longer susceptible to recruitment into such groups.
- * **Ministry of Health:** Officials would be required to do health profiling so that the necessary support is given to participants who might be experiencing significant health challenges. Ex-combatants may have been exposed to sexually transmitted diseases and other conditions that could easily spread within the camp. Women and children would need to be screened for pregnancies, HIV/AIDs, substance abuse among other conditions. This should include the provision of initial psycho-social support, trauma and counseling sessions. This will facilitate the process of transition to rehabilitation.
- * **Ministry of Budget and National Planning:** They are charged with ensuring that resources are properly allocated and budgeted in the Annual National Budget. Additionally, the ministry must ensure that these resources are promptly released for demobilization and that they are used judiciously.
- * **International Development Partners:** They can provide funding and technical assistance in the demobilization exercise to ensure they adhere to standard practices and are tailored to the specific needs of the ex-combatants and vulnerable groups such as women and children. Technical assistance and expertise must be specifically given in the areas of monitoring and evaluation.
- * **National Identity Management Commission:** The commission can be engaged in the collation of bio data and creation of a comprehensive database of all the participants in the demobilization process. This would include disaggregating them in terms of age, gender, height and communities of extraction so as to allow tailor-made interventions for specific groups and effective monitoring and evaluation of the process.

2.6 Funding

It is recommended that funding for demobilization programmes should be administered by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA) in line with its proposed oversight status. Funding mechanisms must be structured to ensure transparency and accountability in order to prevent fresh grievances and mistrust. The Office of the National Security Adviser may also seek international development funding for this purpose as a short term measure to augment government financing.

2.7 Risks and Assumptions

As with every other process, there are risks to be considered in the proposed demobilization process:

i) Political will and national buy-in is sacrosanct for its success- if these are absent the programme will fail.

Mitigation Strategy: *Ensure the development of political capital strong enough to promote political will and national buy-in.*

ii) The failure to manage expectations of the ex-combatants and other groups in the disarmament and demobilization programmes could discourage participation. Further, communities who could have provided information to support this process may also renege.

Mitigation Strategy: *Effective and continuous communication with participants and the entire community on the objectives and expected outcomes of the process. Goal-setting with participants at onset of program and review at the end. Never make promises that you cannot guarantee fulfilling.*

iii) The process might occasion resentment and sentiments of favoritism by victims of violence if perceived as 'rewarding violent extremist offenders.'

Mitigation Strategy: *Ensure that IDPs, impacted communities, returnees, other victims enjoy at least as much assistance as ex-combatants. Winning the hearts and minds of the communities through continuous engagement is essential.*

iv) The fear that demobilization camp may serve as a center for re-radicalization by infiltrating violent extremist offenders is legitimate

Mitigation Strategy: *Screening and profiling must therefore be thorough before admission into the camp. Regular risk assessments of the participants is important to ascertain the possibility of radicalization in the camp.*

vii) The needs of special groups - particularly children and women, are often different from those of men and the risk of missing the opportunity to respond appropriately is high.

Mitigation Strategy: *Develop specific intervention programs for the special groups based on their profiles and needs assessment*

viii) The perception of losing 'power' and 'respect' in their communities might discourage local militias from cooperating with the demobilization process.

Mitigation Strategy: *Integrate local militia into vigilantes groups or state security agencies to support community security management.*

ix) Drug addiction and Post Traumatic Stress Disorder might also turn out to be disruptors if not effectively managed.

Mitigation Strategy: *Health screening and profiling to determine the provision of adequate psycho-social support on the camp*

xi) The multi-agency dynamic of demobilization could also cause fissures if not properly coordinated.

Mitigation Strategy: *The development of effective coordination mechanism that fosters effective communication, synergy and ownership by all agencies involved in disarmament and demobilization should be prioritized.*

3. DERADICALISATION AND REHABILITATION

3.1 Description

Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation are interdependent processes that can contribute to the disengagement of ex-combatants from violence and prepare them for reintegration into communities. Deradicalisation is a psychological and cognitive process through which individuals experience a fundamental change in their beliefs as a pre-cursor to disengagement from violent extremism. It is important to understand the pathways of violent extremism and the motivations of those who joined violent extremist groups voluntarily, in order to create programs that are responsive to the needs of participants. The process of dissociation from these groups should not be understated- it is therefore important to involve families and key community leaders in the deradicalisation and rehabilitation processes to facilitate dissociation from these groups. This is particularly essential when ex-combatants reintegrate into communities- stigmatisation and discrimination on account of their role in the violent conflict could push them back into groups such as Boko Haram.

The Rehabilitation of violent extremist offenders (VEO) is defined in this document as the purposeful, strategic, planned intervention, which aims at changing the characteristics and status of the violent extremist offenders in terms of their attitudes, cognitive skills and processes, personality or mental health, and social, educational or vocational skills that are believed to be the cause of their extremism. This is with the intention to reduce the chance of recidivism. It is recommended that deradicalisation and rehabilitation should involve victims, affected communities and perpetrators. They should be embedded in the following interventions so as to contribute to a whole of government and whole of society approach to countering violent extremism: Operation Safe Corridor; Prison-based deradicalisation and Community-based Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation.

3.2 Core Principles

- Context of Individual Communities be considered
- It should be needs-based and intelligence driven

- Equal treatment and non-discrimination
- Respect for human rights
- Human and community security
- Inter-agency cooperation and collaboration
- Transparency and accountability
- Gender and cultural sensitivity
- Services of Experts
- Training and Capacity Development

3.3 Operation Safe Corridor

Operation Safe Corridor is a joint, multi-national and multi-agency humanitarian operation set up by the Federal Government in 2015 that aims at contributing to stability in North East Nigeria. Operation Safe Corridor is a programme that enables repentant Boko Haram ex-combatants who have surrendered to security agencies to engage in a deradicalisation, rehabilitation and reintegration process, after they have been screened, classified and cleared for participation in these processes. A joint profiling cell is domiciled at Operation Lafiya Dole Theatre which handled the debriefing of all surrendered combatants before they are sent for 16 – week deradicalisation and rehabilitation interventions at a camp in Gombe state.

Operation Safe Corridor consists of **two main staff groups** that focus specifically on security and deradicalisation. The Security Group consists of the Armed Forces of Nigeria, the Nigerian Police Force, Department of State Services (DSS), Nigeria Immigration Service (NIS) and the Nigeria Security and Defence Corps (NSDC) while the deradicalisation group includes the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), federal ministries, departments and agencies, National Orientation Agency (NOA) and the National Directorate of Employment (NDE). Operation Safe Corridor is overseen by a committee chaired by the Chief of Defence Staff and it includes the Executive Governors of Adamawa, Borno and Yobe states, as well as the Inspector General of Police (IGP), Director of Department of Security Service (DSS), Director General of the National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA) as members.

3.3.1 Target Groups

It is necessary to recognise that the target group for Operation Safe Corridor should not be limited to repentant combatants. This should also include Civilian JTF, those associated with Boko Haram as well as women and children formerly held captive by violent extremist offenders.

3.3.2 Actions

There must be a management structure that can ensure there is a coordinated process that enables target groups to be monitored from the demobilisation stage to Operation Safe Corridor. This can foster collaboration among stakeholders and assess the programmatic impact of the entire DDRR programme. The demobilization programme and Operation Safe Corridor should not operate in silos as their processes are interdependent. While the military and police undertake the demobilisation process, it is expected the programme of Operation Safe Corridor be demilitarised and civilian experts should handle the programmes of deradicalisation and rehabilitation as designed. The actions to be taken include:

- * **Central Database:** The development of a central database for Operation Safe Corridor Programme to include demographics, risks, needs, ideological and personality traits of ex-combatants is essential for requisite synergy between the DDRR processes. This is important in monitoring and evaluation to assess the likelihood of recidivism post release.
- * **Personnel and Resources:** Operation Safe Corridor specialist programmes focused on deradicalisation and rehabilitation must have the requisite personnel and resources to prepare ex-combatants for the reintegration process. These processes need to be interlinked with reintegration by involving families of ex-combatants, community leaders, clergy and other stakeholders that can support social and economic reintegration once the ex-combatants have been released.
- * **Community Engagement:** Community engagements and rehabilitation programmes supported by government interventions in post conflict reconstruction and economic recovery need to occur in parallel with Operation Safe Corridor to reduce the risks of recidivism. The risks attendant with releasing ex-combatants into an environment in which the root causes and enablers of violent conflict remain unaddressed could lead to a relapse into violent extremism.

3.3.3 Key Actors

The key actors identified for this work should be extended to many of the government and security agencies, including international development partners that are relevant in the implementation of DDRR. This should include:

- * **The Operation Safe Corridor Committee:** They provide strategic oversight of the programme to ensure that its objectives are met. The representation

of the Governors of Borno, Yobe and Adamawa states is important in facilitating the reintegration processes when ex-combatants and other participants are released from the programme.

- * **Security agencies:** The Armed Forces of Nigeria, the Nigerian Police Force, Nigeria Immigration Service and Nigeria Security and Civil Defence Corps (NSCDC) comprise the Security Group that should be responsible for security provision at the Operation Safe Corridor Camp.
- * **Office of the National Security Adviser:** This office provides the technical expertise required in the deradicalisation programmes of Operation Safe Corridor and supports the monitoring of the process to ensure it meets its set objectives.
- * **Nigeria Prison Service:** This is the lead agency for the deradicalisation group which is directly involved in psychotherapy and social therapy of ex-combatants to promote disengagement from violent extremism.
- * **International Development Partners:** They contribute funding and provide technical assistance to the Operation Safe Corridor Committee, and build the capacity of personnel directly involved in the implementation of the deradicalisation programme. UN agencies such as UNICEF, World Food Programme, International Organisation of Migration (IOM), United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) also provide technical and material support to women and children who need to undergo a 12- week rehabilitation programme conducted by the Borno State Ministry of Women Affairs and Social Development.
- * **National Drug Law Enforcement Agency (NDLEA):** This agency is charged with the provision of psycho-social support to ex-combatants involved in substance abuse ahead of their reintegration into communities.
- * **National Directorate of Employment (NDE):** This agency is tasked with the responsibility of providing rudimentary vocational training at the Operation Safe Corridor camp. These vocations include carpentry, farming, tailoring, welding, photography, masonry and driving. When the ex-combatants are released from the camp, they can also be enrolled in NDE Skill Acquisition Centres in their states of residence. The intervention should be tailored in such a manner that income generation is made feasible through trainings on skills relevant to the communities of the ex-combatants.
- * **National Emergency Management Agency (NEMA):** They provide for the basic needs of the ex-combatants such as food, water, sanitation and hygiene promotion at the camp.
- * **Federal Ministry of Women and Social Development:** The ministry works with its state counterpart in Borno to conduct a 12 -week Rehabilitation Programme for women and children who have surrendered and are dependants of the ex-combatants.

- * **National Orientation Agency:** They provide support with strategic communication of the Operation Safe Corridor exercise and provide the requisite sensitisation of the programme to key stakeholders, including community members.
- * **Families of ex-combatants:** Families need to be involved in the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes of ex-combatants to provide psycho-social support and ease the social reintegration process.
- * **Religious leaders:** Deradicalisation involves altering the violent fundamentalist beliefs of ex-combatants to reduce the likelihood of recidivism when they are released from the 16-week programme. Clergy men are particularly important in this process especially when ex-combatants have used fundamentalist religious beliefs to justify the perpetration of violence. Religious education must encompass all religions especially including those who do not subscribe to Christianity and Islam. There is need rebrand of religious leaders within affected communities to create legitimacy for their interventions at various levels of the DDDR. As it stands, most religious interventions are isolated and spontaneous. It is thus important to create a national policy framework for the coordination of interventions by government and non-government actors as well as the development partners. This will help to give legitimacy and harmonize the engagement of religious leaders. Such policy should include providing secure and conducive environments for participation in the DDDR process.

3.3.4 Risks and Assumptions

i) Ex-combatants who surrender to the Government may not necessarily be repentant of their actions and may join the OSC Program just to benefit from the intervention.

Mitigation Strategy: *OSC demobilization process should deploy technically competent security screening methodology to screen repentant- ex-combatants to verify claims of repentance.*

ii) Limited capacity of personnel to implement deradicalisation and rehabilitation programs could adversely affect the outcomes of the intervention.

Mitigation Strategy: *Government Officials deployed as DR specialists should be given special training of deradicalisation and rehabilitation in the context of the OSC mandate to deliver competently and skilfully*

iii) OSC camps could be susceptible to attacks and infiltration from violent extremist offenders if there isn't adequate security and an effective screening process

Mitigation Strategy: *There should be adequate surveillance of OSC camp and operations to guarantee safety of inhabitants and to prevent infiltration by criminal elements.*

iv) The mandatory 16- week program at OSC may not be sufficient to prepare ex-combatants for reintegration

Mitigation Strategy: *The supervision of intervention programmes should ensure that the key performance indicators for deradicalisation and rehabilitation are achieved within the stipulated time frame of 16 weeks. These programs should be flexible enough to adapt to the risks and needs demonstrated by the individuals if the 16-week period is not sufficient to achieve the key performance indicators and objectives of the programmes.*

3.4 Prison-Based Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation

The deradicalization model adopted for use in Nigerian institutions consist of four stages, namely; engage, risk assessment, needs assessment and response / interventions. A prison-based model requires the direct treatment of ex-combatants by specialized personnel within the designated period of 16 weeks. The deradicalization component targets to reduce the risk of violent extremism and to cause behavioural change that sustains their decision to desist and disengage from violent extremism.

The prison-based model must incorporate a regular needs assessment system so that the programme is responsive to the needs of the ex-combatants and can be adapted to suit the changes in attitude and behaviour. These efforts often yield information that enable experts to design behaviour management plans (BMPs) with measurable risks and needs reduction targets using a risk-need- responsivity model that can assess whether an ex-combatant is likely to relapse into violence when they are eventually released. Strength-based approaches should also be integrated into prison-based deradicalisation programmes; these approaches can be used to identify the inherent strengths of ex-combatants and how they can be used constructively when they are eventually released from prison.

Deradicalisation precedes rehabilitation which is an important process that prepares ex-combatants for their transition into society - socially and economically; as such, the inclusion of families during the programme to facilitate social reintegration as well as vocational training to equip them with skills necessary for economic reintegration is necessary.

3.4.1 Target Groups

The target groups should include ex-combatants and violent extremist offenders who may include women and children, as well as those who directly or indirectly engaged in the conflict.

3.4.2 Actions

The government of Nigeria should support the Nigerian Prison Service and all custodial facilities responsible for deradicalization and rehabilitation to adhere to the universally accepted Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners which provides as follows:

The Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners

The treatment of prisoners sentenced to imprisonment or a similar measure shall have as its purpose... to establish in them the will to lead law-abiding and self-supporting lives after their release and to fit them to do so. The treatment shall be such as will encourage their self-respect and develop their sense of responsibility (SMR, Rule 65).

To these ends, all appropriate means shall be used, including religious care in the countries where this is possible, education, vocational guidance and training, social casework, employment counselling, physical development and strengthening of moral character, in accordance with the individual needs of each prisoner, taking account of his social and criminal history, his physical and mental capacities and aptitudes, his personal temperament, the length of his sentence and his prospects after release (SMR, Rule 66:1).

Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation programmes should be implemented through the following activities:

- * **Psychological interventions:** Scientific risk assessments need to be conducted to ascertain the types of psychological interventions needed for individual prisoners undergoing deradicalisation and rehabilitation. Risk-Need- Responsivity models are recommended so that the risks assessments include the kinds of environments they should be placed in to reduce recidivism.
- * **Religious engagements:** These interventions normally occur within the deradicalisation process and are dependent on whether fundamentalist religious beliefs contributed to participation in violent extremist activities. This is an important aspect in contributing to the disengagement of participant from sources of violence through religious teachings that embrace peace. This involves the use of strategic communication and religious counselling- it is crucial that there is a dialogue process to facilitate deradicalisation.
- * **Vocational training:** Socio-economic assessments can be used to determine the type of vocational training that is relevant to the needs of the prisoner and is also economically viable in the environment the prisoner will be released into. Mapping socio-economic opportunities is a process and needs to be conducted periodically especially in post conflict environments where there might be peculiar economic challenges.
- * **Expressive Art therapy:** This is a form of psychotherapy that uses art media and the creative process to enable individuals to explore their feelings, promote self-awareness, improve social skills and address conflicting emotions. This is important in addiction recovery, trauma healing and treatment for mental and emotional challenges such as depression. It is recommended that local art therapy techniques are used which may include, dance, drama and visual art.
- * **Sports and games:** The use of sports in the rehabilitation of prisoners improves their social behaviour and fosters the learning of social values and social rules. This could also help the reintegration of ex-combatants into communities where they engage in sports competitions with other community members.

3.4.3 Key Actors

- * **Office of the National Security Adviser:** This office should be mandated to provide strategic oversight and supervision of the entire DDDR process alongside other key stakeholders to ensure the process achieves its set objectives and adequate resources are allocated for this purpose.
- * **The Judiciary:** The courts are responsible for the conviction, sentencing and release of ex-combatants held in prisons. It is important that the judicial processes are efficient to prevent a backlog of cases and ensure that justice is dispensed accordingly. The juvenile system that caters to children involved in crime should be revamped to cater for ex-combatants so that they can also benefit from deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes in the juvenile system.
- * **Nigerian Prison Service:** This office is responsible for the direct implementation of deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. The personnel must be trained to handle these specialised programmes and ensure they coordinate with other stakeholders responsible for the reintegration process of ex-combatants released from prison. Nigerian Prison Service needs to provide programmatic support and monitor the outcomes and mechanisms through which ex-combatants undergo deradicalization and rehabilitation. It is important that the Nigerian Prison Service periodically evaluates these programmes so they can adjust their strategies accordingly.

- * **Ministry of Women and Social development:** Prison deradicalisation programmes as originally designed presuppose that all ex-combatants are male. It is important that the Ministry of Women and Social Development works with the Nigerian Prison Service to support the design and implementation of programmes that are specific to women and children. This is to ensure that these programmes are gender sensitive and can help address specific rehabilitative needs of these special groups. The Ministry can also work with its state counterparts to facilitate the reintegration of women and children when they are released from prison.
- * **National Directorate of Employment:** This is the foremost agency in charge of job creation in the country and is saddled with the responsibility of the provision of vocational training under their Employment Skills Acquisition Team. The Directorate would also be responsible for socio-economic assessments of environments in which ex-combatants would be reintegrated. This is to ensure that the local economies are able to absorb the ex-combatants and foster economic reintegration.
- * **Religious Organisations:** These organisations would be involved in the deradicalisation process where ex-combatants may have been lured into violent extremism through fundamentalist religious teaching. The distortion of religious ideology needs to be countered through dialogue, teachings and constant engagement with ex-combatants to facilitate deradicalisation and disengagement from violence.
- * **Civil Society Organisations:** They can provide technical expertise in the deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes.
- * **International Development Partners:** Funding for deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes for ex-combatants may require support from international development partners. They may also provide technical assistance and help monitor the process to ensure that it adheres to the Rome Memorandum on Good Practices for Rehabilitation and Reintegration of Violent Extremist Offenders. They might also share lessons from similar programmes that have been implemented in contexts similar to Nigeria's.

3.4.4 Risks and Assumptions

i) Inefficient prosecution and judicial processes that delay court trials

Mitigation strategy: *Strengthening of the prosecutorial and judicial processes to ensure that suspects are tried in a court of law and sentencing is done expeditiously.*

ii) An inadequate system of monitoring the reintegration process of ex-combatants makes it difficult to evaluate the effectiveness of deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes.

Mitigation strategy: *Create an effective monitoring and evaluation strategy that tracks ex-combatants when they are released into their communities.*

iii) The Prison-based Deradicalisation Programme is currently under-resourced with limited support from the Federal Government. Presently, it is funded by international development partners and it mainly caters for 50 prisoners in Kuje Prison among 5000 others being held in other prisons across the country. This could easily increase the risk of radicalisation of other prisoners who may be held for crimes other than violent extremism.

Mitigation Strategy: *The Federal Government needs to allocate adequate resources to the Prison Based Deradicalisation Programme so it can cover other prisons and cater for a larger population of ex-combatants across the country. Adequate funding would also ensure compliance with Standard Minimum Rules for the Treatment of Prisoners.*

iv) Prisoners' families might not be willing to participate in deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes with the ex-combatants for fear of being subjected to unfair scrutiny by security agencies.

Mitigation Strategy: *Building of trust between programme specialists and families is important to ensure their participation in this process. The role of families in deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes is essential to reintegration to restore bonds and trust that may have been broken during violent conflict.*

v) Ex-combatants may experience discrimination when they return to the communities on account of their past atrocities.

Mitigation Strategy: *It is important that parallel interventions that are victim-centred are implemented in communities to promote social transformation and cohesion. Transitional justice and rehabilitation programmes that promote social bonds and restore trust are essential for social reintegration.*

3.5 Community-Based Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation

The objective of community-based deradicalisation and disengagement programmes is to prevent violent extremism, particularly among vulnerable groups within communities that have been identified as potential hotspots. Such identification should be evidence-based through regular conflict analyses conducted by community groups and facilitated by local governments and/or community-based organisations. This would support the development of early warning and early response systems that can be used in the prevention and mitigation of violent extremism. This process needs to be supported by strategic communication techniques that can be used by traditional and religious institutions to sensitise communities on the radicalisation process and common violent extremist

tendencies. This would also ensure that there are local and sustainable models that can be used in preventing/countering violent extremism.

3.5.1 TARGET GROUPS

The target groups at the community level should include vulnerable community members, youths at risk, compromised religious and traditional leaders, direct victims, individuals indirectly affected and special groups associated with the conflict such as women, children and people with special needs.

3.5.2 Actions

A community engagement framework should be established. This should include a needs assessment establishing community perceptions on radicalisation and violence. Interventions by the government and development partners should be conducted to understand community needs, concerns and initiatives. This is extremely important in determining the types of deradicalisation and rehabilitation programmes. It will also encourage community understanding and ownership of the processes, leading to sustainability and stability. It is therefore important that these interventions are locally designed and community-driven to sustain deradicalisation programmes and promote the prevention of violent extremism. Actions to be taken include:

- * **Educational Programmes:** It is useful to include the DR in educational programmes of secondary and tertiary institutions to ensure that counter-narratives are also embedded in the curricula. A community - wide sensitisation programme that targets families, teachers, youth and community leadership structures is essential to identification of the early signs of radicalisation, as well as the steps that can be taken to address them. This needs to be done periodically and a community system instituted to ensure that there is a formalised deradicalisation process for ideologues with the potential to engage in violent extremism.
- * **Traditional Peace Mechanisms:** Traditional peacebuilding programmes that promote conflict transformation, conflict mitigation and mediation need to be embedded in community-based deradicalisation and disengagement processes to promote stability in post conflict environments. Peacebuilding measures aim to address root causes of violent extremism and can help strengthen tolerance, resilience and the rule of law in communities. Environmental risk factors need to be addressed to minimise the likelihood of violent extremism.
- * **Institutional Reforms:** Institutional reforms at the state and local government levels may help address structural inequalities and social injustices that may enable violent extremism. It is essential that community deradicalisation programmes are part of a

broad development framework by the Federal government to promote sustainable peace.

- * **Community Security Architecture:** Community security management structures need to be used to promote law and order – the use of non-state security actors such as vigilantes may help address gaps in security provision. It is important that there is a state legal framework for this purpose to limit human rights violations by non-state security actors and to promote accountability in security provision.

3.5.3 Key Actors

- * **State Governments:** They need to take responsibility for the security of lives and properties by ensuring adequate state-wide security provision by promoting the rule of law and instituting reforms that can address structural inequalities. This is to enable members of the vulnerable groups such as women and youth benefit from developmental outcomes. This can contribute to addressing root causes of violent extremism.
- * **Local Governments:** They are the government closest to the communities and therefore need to participate actively in providing the requisite support for grassroots deradicalisation and disengagement programmes. They can drive community-wide sensitisation programmes by holding town hall meetings. They also work state governments by providing information on security provisioning in communities as well as establish ways in which community developmental needs can be addressed.
- * **Religious Leaders:** Religious leaders can use faith-based teachings to promote behavioural change through altering fundamentalist beliefs that may promote violence. They can also serve as arbiters during community disputes that can easily escalate into violence.
- * **Community Leaders:** They need to work with local governments to promote deradicalisation, particularly among vulnerable populations; and support the use of counter-narratives in the media and schools to prevent violent extremism. It is also important that they create governance structures that are inclusive of women and youth in decision making processes so that they can contribute to the development of their communities. Community leaders can also provide local intelligence to security agencies, state and local governments to respond to security threats.
- * **Community Based Organisations (CBOs) and Civil Society Organisations (CSOs):** They can design and implement peacebuilding programmes. They can also provide technical expertise in the facilitation of deradicalisation and disengagement programmes. They are also important in sensitising communities on

how to counter radicalisation and demonstrate how these programmes can be monitored.

- * **International Development Partners:** They can provide funding and technical assistance in designing community led deradicalisation and disengagement programmes. They can also work with Federal and State governments to support post conflict reconstruction and economic recovery to address root causes of violent extremism.
- * **Youth groups:** They can provide peer to peer mentoring to youth –at –risk on using non-violent techniques to address their grievances. They can also facilitate deradicalisation sessions with religious leaders and technical experts. Youth groups also provide platforms through which young people can be engaged in dialogue to establish what their needs are and how these can be addressed.
- * **Women groups:** Women play a crucial role in preventing/countering radicalisation as they are grossly affected by violence conflict. These groups can be used to sensitise women on their role in peacebuilding and also act as a channel through which their grievances can be channelled to the community leadership for their intervention.
- * **Secondary schools:** These institutions can create peace clubs that demonstrate the importance of countering radicalisation. Counter narratives can also be adopted as slogans and peace messaging during assemblies, rallies, sports competitions among other events that bring students together. Posters and other educational materials can be used to support these activities.
- * **Tertiary institutions:** Universities are a beehive for radicalisation and recruitment into violent extremist groups. It is important that these institutions create mechanisms through which students can report early signs of radicalisation amongst their peers, and the necessary interventions implemented to prevent an escalation into violence. The universities need to set up committees for this purpose and work with security agencies, local and state governments to address these threats. Peace messaging and counter narratives can be illustrated through posters, handbills and community radio programmes to discourage radicalisation into violence among students.

3.5.4 Risks and Assumptions

i) Dissenting voices and contrary opinions within communities may be misconstrued as potential risks for violent extremism.

Mitigation Strategy: *Community sensitization on the detection of early warning signs of violent extremism should be carried out*

ii) Stigmatisation of ex-combatants for their previous involvement in violent extremism would make reintegration difficult. This would result in a loss of opportunity to use the experiences of former VEOs as learning models in discouraging at- risk youths from engaging in violent extremism.

Mitigation Strategy: *Local cultural practices that can promote forgiveness and restore social cohesion should be used as part of the process of the reintegration of ex-combatants.*

iii) Social fragmentation of communities as a result of residual crises and rivalries in the aftermath of violent conflicts may make it difficult to use collective approaches to deradicalisation.

Mitigation Strategy: *Conflict transformation, conflict resolution, mediation and restorative justice processes need to be an integral part of community peacebuilding programmes to build social cohesiveness.*



4. TRANSITIONAL JUSTICE

4.1 Description

Transitional Justice is rooted in accountability and redress for victims in the pursuit of societal transformation in post conflict environments. Violent conflict disrupts relationships and in order for transitional processes to work, there must be deep concessions that should promote the inclusion of ex-combatants in the future of society. 'A winner takes it all' approach that clearly pits victims against perpetrators would limit reconciliation and forgiveness thus hindering relational transformation that is essential to peacebuilding, stabilisation and reconstruction. The victim/perpetrator dichotomy is difficult to establish in the aftermath of asymmetric conflicts since perpetrators may have been victims who were forcefully conscripted into violent extremist groups.

This is likely to complicate transitional justice processes that have been previously used in the aftermath of conventional warfare such as civil wars where the distinction between combatants and non-combatants is evident. The design and implementation of transitional justice processes needs to adopt a rule of law approach to address human rights violations that may enable or trigger violent conflicts. It is also important that communities especially vulnerable groups such as women, youth and children contribute to the design of traditional, restorative justice processes that can promote reconciliation.

Transitional justice processes need not be retributive, but restorative and holistic in nature, aimed at mending broken relationships, families and communities. It is recommended that they include institutional reforms; reparations for victims; accountability mechanisms. There should also be truth telling and reconciliation activities to promote civil, political, economic, social and cultural rights of citizens.

4.2 Core Principles

* Transitional justice processes must be victim-centred and provide channels through which they can seek redress and promote reconciliation in communities.

- * There must be a demonstration of gender equity, inclusivity, impartiality and fairness in the dispensation of justice to protect the rights of all the groups affected by violent conflict.
- * Justice must be administered according to the rule of law. Laws that do not address human rights violations sufficiently must be repealed.
- * Administrators of transitional justice processes must be persons of integrity who are trusted enough by communities to dispense justice fairly.
- * Traditional transitional justice processes need to be inclusive of vulnerable groups such as women, girls, persons living with disabilities and children who are worst affected by violent conflicts. These processes need to promote openness to enable victims express themselves without fear of being stigmatised or attacked by those accused of committing atrocities during violent conflicts.

4.3 Target Groups

The target groups should include Violent Extremist Offenders (VEOs), ex-combatants, affected communities, victims of Boko Haram atrocities including women and girls, children and persons living with disability as well as Internally Displaced Persons.

4.4 Actions

- * **Criminal Prosecution:** Criminal prosecution of violent extremist offenders using judicial processes as established by law should be considered for serious offences. The setup of special courts to try violent extremist suspects may help to expedite the dispensation of justice. This will also assuage the anger and bitterness of victims and affected communities. Importantly, it will demonstrate the level of moral revulsion against impunity at all levels.

- * **Human Rights Violations Investigations:** Investigations into human rights violations committed by state security actors, violent extremist offenders, local vigilantes and other related groups is essential. Transitional justice must be victim-centred. Retributive justice is also important in addressing impunity and acting as a deterrent against future re-occurrences of violent extremism.
- * **Victim Reparation:** Reparations for victims of human rights violations should include material and symbolic benefits that demonstrate a direct and meaningful way for victims to receive justice. They also serve as an obligation for the state to address the consequences of violent conflicts that they may have participated in or failed to prevent. Reparations might be monetary or provided in kind; such as the provision of housing, free healthcare, education and physical rehabilitation. It is important reparations are given based on a needs assessment to ensure that they are given to those who were actually victims of violent conflicts. There must be mechanisms created by government at all levels to ensure that there is transparency and accountability in this process. Reparations can be administered through programmes or can be forced through litigation. The Federal Government needs to set up a body backed by law that could facilitate transitional justice processes that integrate reparations as an essential aspect of community resettlement and reintegration. It is important that this body would maintain a database of losses incurred during violent conflicts and establish mechanisms that can facilitate the process of disbursing reparations to victims. The government should create a mechanism for administering recovered loots, especially those by the state agents and the CJTF as these could help support the reparation programmes.
- * **Traditional Justice Mechanisms:** Development of traditional platforms for truth-telling and reconciliation to promote forgiveness and build social cohesion is important. Community leadership structures can be used to foster this process as an avenue for victims to seek redress for the human rights violations they suffered during violent conflicts. This process might be difficult to administer in situations where the dichotomy between victims and perpetrators is difficult to establish. It is important that human rights commissions and other relevant bodies are involved in setting up and administering these platforms for victims. State actors must also be subject to these processes particularly when they have been involved in committing atrocities against the population or where they simply failed in their responsibility to protect communities against violence. Transitional justice needs to include all parties to a conflict for the process to appear fair and impartial.
- * **Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR):** Alternative Dispute Resolution (ADR) mechanisms need to be

established to promote conflict resolution. These mechanisms are particularly important in the prevention of escalation of violence in post conflict environments where peace is fragile. These processes can be conducted outside courts of law and can be administered by community leaders, religious leaders, opinion leaders and paralegals. Civil society organisations can train key community members in these processes to ensure that dialogue is promoted, and parties to a dispute do not have to resort to violence to resolve problems.

4.5 Key Actors:

- * **The Judiciary:** They administer the formal court processes that convict, sentence and release those accused of committing crimes. The judiciary may create special courts to try suspects of violent extremism so as to expedite the dispensation of justice to avoid the unnecessary delays and backlog of cases which tend to bedevil the current judicial processes.
- * **The Ministry of Justice:** The Federal Ministry of Justice can work with their state counterparts to ensure that the necessary structures are in place to promote the rule of law and transitional justice mechanisms adhere to the basic tenets of the law.
- * **Nigerian Bar Association (NBA):** As a key stakeholder, the association can provide technical and legal assistance in designing and implementing transitional justice mechanisms.
- * **Paralegals:** They are judicial officers who can be trained to offer legal assistance and representation of victims of violent conflicts before national courts or through other transitional justice mechanisms.
- * **National Human Rights Commission (NHRC):** The National Human Rights Commission can coordinate the development of non-judicial platforms that can be used to determine the facts, root causes and consequences of violent conflicts from the testimony of victims. This is to ensure that there is recognition of the suffering of those who were most affected by violent conflicts. The NHRC can also contribute to institutional reform processes to prevent human rights violations from recurring in post conflict environments.
- * **Federation of Women Lawyers (FIDA):** FIDA can represent women and girls who have suffered sexual violence and also contribute to law reforms that can serve as a deterrent against sexual abuse.
- * **Traditional Council of Chiefs:** They can lead on the conflict resolution process using traditional approaches appropriate to the cultural context of the community. These traditional approaches can also be used to promote reconciliation and forgiveness to foster social reintegration and cohesion particularly in fragmented communities.

- * **Security Agencies:** The Nigeria Police Force (NPF) and the Nigerian Civil Defence and Security Corp (NDSC) can help promote community security management by collaborating with non-state security actors to mitigate against spoilers who may attempt to thwart the outcomes of the transitional justice processes. Spoilers may also intimidate witnesses or even attempt to launch revenge attacks on those perceived to be their enemies.
- * **Religious leaders:** Clergymen can use faith-based methods to promote reconciliation and forgiveness using their platforms. They can also be involved in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to ensure that non adversarial methods are used to address grievances.
- * **Civil Society Organisations (CSOs):** This set of organisations can provide input at the different levels of the transitional justice processes and monitor their outcomes. They can support government, community leaders and other stakeholders to ensure that the processes are inclusive and adhere to basic human rights standards.
- * **Women leaders:** They can mobilise women to participate in transitional justice processes and serve as channels through which women can provide their inputs into how these processes can be shaped to meet the needs of victims of sexual violence and other types of crime. They can also participate in traditional conflict resolution mechanisms to ensure that women are not excluded from these processes or unduly tried for crimes they did not commit.
- * **Youth leaders:** Youth and children are seriously affected by human rights violations, and recognising them as a special group who can break the inter-generational cycles of violence and impunity is important for the successful outcomes of transitional justice processes. Youth leaders can serve as channels through which youth voices can be amplified during these processes, and they can also provide support in promoting reconciliation and forgiveness by holding sports competitions and other solidarity events.
- * **International development partners:** They can provide funding, technical assistance and training for institutions and community groups who will participate in transitional justice processes. They can also exert pressure on governments to ensure that the processes are inclusive, just, fair and represent the interests of the victims.

4.6 Risks and Assumptions

I) The risk of using a 'one size fits all' approach to transitional justice processes may hinder the dispensation of justice and lead to a relapse into violence as victims use reprisal attacks to seek for justice against crimes committed against them.

Mitigation Strategy: *Transitional Justice processes must be contextually relevant and include communities, local governments, civil society organisations and other relevant stakeholders in the design, implementation and monitoring of these programmes.*

ii) The lack of political will to administer transitional justice processes particularly when state actors such security personnel and politicians are accused of human rights violations could easily mar the process of restoring the rule of law in post conflict environments. It could also create enablers for violent conflict when it appears that specific groups are protected by the law.

Mitigation Strategy: *Transitional justice processes need to institute mechanisms that protect administrators from political interference and security threats*

iii) Institutional reforms that target security sector, judicial processes and other government bodies may not be prioritised during transitional justice processes due to limited resources and the lack of political will. This would make it difficult to institutionalise the protection and respect for human rights which would impact the relationship between communities and the state. This breach in social contract could become an enabler for violent conflicts where the structural causes of poverty, unemployment and gender inequality remain unaddressed.

Mitigation Strategy: *The Federal Government needs to provide resources that can help promote institutional reforms and address the structural causes of violent conflicts. This could contribute to peace and stability in the long term.*

5. REINTEGRATION

5.1 Description

Reintegration is the overall objective of Demobilisation, Deradicalisation and Rehabilitation of victims and ex-combatants; the failure of ex-combatants to reintegrate into communities could lead to recidivism. It is essential that communities are prepared to accept and receive ex-combatants and other groups affected by violent conflict when they return. Effective reintegration is influenced by the way communities, authorities, and ex-combatants work together to build a safe and secure environment. This can be particularly difficult in the aftermath of conflict where resources might be scarce and institutions are yet to be equipped to respond to the needs of citizens. This could also easily reinforce local animosities and eventually lead to another cycle of violence. It is recommended that short term stabilisation approaches be considered before long term sustainable processes are implemented to respond to the immediate needs of communities such as healthcare, education, shelter and food.

Reintegration requires a holistic programme of activities that is designed in collaboration with communities, civil society organisations, organised private sector and other relevant stakeholders to ensure national ownership of the process. It is important that a National Action Plan to support the implementation of the programme is developed, and there is sufficient political will to provide the requisite resources to ensure the process is sustainable. There must be a development framework that can support the restoration of quality service delivery, infrastructural development, rule of law and institutional reform to create the necessary conditions that can contribute to sustainable peace.

Political, social and economic reintegration need to be given due consideration to help address key drivers of violent extremism, taking into cognisance the peculiar needs of vulnerable groups such as women, children, persons living with disability and internally displaced persons (IDPs).

5.2 Core Principles

- * Reintegration processes need to be adaptable in order to respond to contextual changes. In post conflict environments, there are attendant complexities in reintegration of various groups which may have conflicting interests. Such interests may deepen fragmentation of communities due to political, ethnic or religious loyalties. Reintegration is a complex process that requires a sustainable and flexible approach that needs to be based on regular assessments which includes feedback from target community groups, civil society organisations and other stakeholders involved in the process. Longitudinal evaluations of reintegration processes are recommended to provide input into development frameworks.
- * A human rights-based approach should guide the reintegration processes to ensure the rights of all groups including ex-combatants are respected. This is why community engagement needs to be mainstreamed throughout the DDRR process to ensure that reintegration processes are effective. Respect for human rights of the various groups returning to the community would reduce stigmatisation, discrimination and the likelihood of reprisal attacks. The state must ensure that the rule of law is promoted and human rights violations committed by government personnel are addressed.
- * Transparency and accountability mechanisms need to be integrated across the different types of reintegration processes. These must be present at the national, state and local government levels. This is important in ensuring that resources allocated for reintegration processes are judiciously utilised and measures instituted to penalise those involved in diverting resources for their personal gain. The relationship between state and citizens can be complex during conflict situations and government needs to restore trust in order to foster peace.

- * Inclusivity needs to be at the core of reintegration processes to ensure that vulnerable groups such as women, children, persons living with disability among others, who are most affected by violent conflicts, can benefit from the process, as well as provide the necessary support to ensure it succeeds. It is essential that these groups participate in the design of the reintegration process so that there is local ownership. The exclusion of groups based on ethnicity, religion, political affiliation and gender from reintegration processes could deepen divisions with communities and become an enabler for another cycle of violence.

5.3 Target Groups

The target groups for reintegration should include ex-combatants, women and girls who might be victims of sexual violence, children, affected communities, displaced persons, former captives of violent extremist groups, affected soldiers and their families and other non-state armed groups.

5.4 Actions

- * Conduct needs assessment to ascertain how the reintegration process will be designed and implemented. This process should also include identification of key actors, target groups and resources required.
- * Provision of psycho-social support services to heal traumatic memories; provision of specialized counseling services on reproductive health, estranged relationships, adoption, educational and even career issues to build individual resilience for psychological adjustment and to promote mental health are relevant herein.
- * Provision of age-based, gender specific and faith-based humanitarian services through accredited state and non-state actors
- * Strengthen primary health and secondary health care to monitor and respond promptly to the nutritional, reproductive, environmental and mental health needs of communities and defining a credible referral pathway for tertiary health care for hard cases.
- * Promoting youth development through skill acquisition, entrepreneurial training, sports, arts and musical talent activities as a means of constructive engagement.
- * Assisting state and local government structures to develop leadership capacities that promote democratic values, inclusivity and participation.
- * Promoting truth, reconciliation and forgiveness by establishing community-based platforms. These can include intercultural and interfaith dialogues to

promote tolerance, peaceful co-existence and communal synergy on partnership for safety and community resilience.

- * Strengthen the capacity of social welfare services for contact tracing and reconnection of erstwhile internally displaced family members, including detained violent extremist offenders.
- * Develop a community security management network of stakeholders for community policing, civilian-military relationships and participation in community conflict early warning and early response systems. A review of the National Security Architecture to incorporate non-state security actors in the provision of community security would contribute to the maintenance of law and order. It would also support the prevention of violent conflicts as communities become empowered to provide information that would lead to the mitigation against such conflicts.
- * The Federal and state governments need to devise systems through which unclaimed properties in the post conflict era are not subject to community dispute. This will help prevent the properties from becoming havens for criminal activity.
- * Development of an effective participatory monitoring and evaluation mechanism to appraise the implementation of the reintegration programmes by stakeholders to assess progress.

5.5 Key Actors

- * **State governments:** They need to allocate and utilize resources judiciously to create a socio-environment that promotes development so as to address root causes and enablers of violent extremism. This can include creating an enabling business environment for small scale enterprises, rebuilding infrastructure and improving service delivery especially in the health and education sectors.
- * **Local governments:** They can participate in the needs assessment of communities and support state governments in promoting socio-economic development in the aftermath of violent conflicts.
- * **Community Leaders:** They need to provide support to the reintegration process by promoting activities that can build social cohesion and work with others levels of government to address the root causes of violent conflicts. They also provide platforms through which communities can express their needs and they can also act as a bridge between the state and the citizenry.
- * **State Houses of Assembly:** They are responsible for making laws that can help promote socio-economic development. They can also hold states accountable for how they use their resources to implement activities

that support reintegration processes. The parliamentarians must provide checks and balances to ensure that the socio-economic and political rights of their constituents are respected by the state. They can also enact laws that can promote institutional reforms and facilitate respect for rule of law.

- * **Media:** They can provide platforms through which the state and the citizens can hold dialogues and also provide an opportunity to monitor the reintegration processes by holding the state, community leaders and other stakeholders to account for their activities. The media must be independent and devoid of political influence so that they can carry out their watch dog functions.
- * **Civil Society Organisations (CSOs):** They can engage in reintegration processes by providing strategic guidance to the government and communities to ensure that programmes can achieve set objectives. They can also monitor the processes to ensure that they are conflict-sensitive, gender –responsive, inclusive and respect human rights.
- * **International development partners:** They can contribute resources to reintegration programmes and provide technical assistance where necessary.
- * **Organised Private Sector:** The government can only provide an enabling environment for businesses while organized private sector may provide the much needed investment to stimulate local economies and promote small and medium business enterprises. This can help foster economic reintegration and reduce the likelihood for another cycle of violence.
- * **Security agencies:** They need to provide security to protect lives and properties as reintegration processes may include spoilers who may commit crimes and frustrate social and economic activities within the community.
- * **Families of returnees:** They need to provide the moral support to those who have returned to the communities either as ex-combatants or former captives to reduce stigmatization and discrimination and aid social reintegration.
- * **Women groups:** They can help contribute to the reintegration of women and girls who were formerly captives or victims of sexual violence. They tend to experience discrimination when they return to communities and this can limit their influence in countering and preventing violent extremism.
- * **Youth groups:** Ex-combatants tend to fall within this category and they require support from youth groups to re-engage with communities. These youth groups can also serve as platforms through which reconciliation

and forgiveness can be promoted. They could help facilitate dialogues between victims and perpetrators. Ex-combatants can also be used to promote peace by sharing their experiences and encouraging their peers to promote peace.

- * **Ministry of Information and Culture:** They can help promote peace messaging through television, radio, newspapers and posters.
- * **Ministry of Women and Social Affairs:** They can work with their state counterparts to mobilise women groups to support the reintegration of women and girls who are victims of violent conflict through economic empowerment, trauma healing and counselling.
- * **Ministry of Agriculture and Rural Development:** They can work with the state ministries to design and implement agricultural programmes that can support farmers to re-engage in economic activities in the aftermath of violent conflict.
- * **Small and Medium Enterprises Development Agency (SMEDAN):** There are zonal offices that can carry out the mandate of the agency which focuses on stimulating, monitoring and coordinating the development of small and medium enterprises. The agency can link enterprises to finance, appropriate technology as well as provide technical skills in building and expanding small scale businesses.

5.6 RISKS AND ASSUMPTIONS

i) Contextual challenges such as limited access to primary health care, high illiteracy rates, inadequate infrastructure and other developmental factors could hinder the reintegration process if there are no stop gap measures to ensure immediate needs of communities and returnees are addressed.

Mitigation Strategy: *Short-term stabilization approaches need to be developed to address the immediate humanitarian needs of communities ahead of long term measures such as economic recovery and reconstruction.*

ii) Insecurity could hinder implementation of developmental programmes aimed at contributing to stability in communities.

Mitigation Strategy: *Community security management structures must be instituted to support community policing by non-state actors in partnership with security agencies. It is important that maintaining law and order is perceived as a collective responsibility and civil-military relations are built to support adequate security provision.*

iii) Limited economic opportunities could hinder the restoration of livelihoods and economic reintegration.

Mitigation Strategy: *In preparation for the return of ex-combatants and other groups to the communities, it is*

important that a socio-economic assessment is conducted to establish how livelihoods can be restored and the local economy stimulated. Skills acquisition and small enterprise programmes need to be matched with existing opportunities in local economies to avoid exacerbating unemployment levels and creating conditions for illicit economies to thrive.

iv) Exclusion of communities and other key stakeholders from the design and implementation of reintegration programmes causing disenfranchisement and lack of ownership of the process.

Mitigation Strategy: *Inclusion of all key stakeholders in the design, monitoring and implementation of reintegration programmes by ensuring that community engagements are mainstreamed through each stage of the processes.*

v) There is the challenge of stigmatisation of victims of insurgency particularly women, girls and children who are sexually abused and forcefully conscripted into violent extremist groups to perform roles such as cooking, spying and running errands.

Mitigation Strategy: *The dichotomy between victims and perpetrators can be difficult to decipher in asymmetric warfare; it is important that parallel interventions to the demobilisation, deradicalisation and rehabilitation of various target groups affected by the conflict are held, to enable communities accept the returnees ahead of the*

reintegration processes. It is also important that families are involved in the deradicalisation and rehabilitation of ex-combatants and other target groups to ease social reintegration.

vi) Lack of political will to carry out successful reintegration programmes could make it difficult to address the drivers of violent extremism and create an environment for violence to escalate in communities.

Mitigation Strategy: *Civil society organisations (CSOs), international development partners and community groups need to monitor reintegration programmes to ensure there's transparency and accountability. It is also important that pressure is exerted on all levels of government to fulfill their roles and responsibilities.*

vii) Poor coordination of state and non-state actors in reintegration processes may lead to unnecessary rivalries and competition for resources to the detriment of beneficiaries.

Mitigation Strategy: *A national coordination platform needs to be created to ensure that reintegration programmes achieve their strategic objectives. This platform would include representatives from ministries, departments and agencies; state and local government officials; civil society organisations; international development partners; security agencies and; community representatives.*

CONCLUSION

The Demobilisation, Deradicalisation, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR) Policy Implementation Strategy is intended to provide guidance to stakeholders in the design and implementation of the DDRR Framework. It is essential that implementation of the Framework is tailored to contextual realities and the process of design, monitoring and implementation is participatory. It is important to emphasize that this is not a one size-fits-all strategy. The communities are the ultimate beneficiaries of the DDRR processes. It is thus important that community engagement involving the inclusion of vulnerable groups such as women, youth and persons living with disabilities is mainstreamed throughout this process.

An overarching programmatic strategy that uses a realist approach to design, monitor and implement is essential in ensuring that the objectives of these processes are achieved. The DDRR process is non-linear, and in order for it to work, it should be adaptable to the political, cultural, religious and socio-economic dynamics that tend to pervade post-conflict environments. Monitoring and Evaluation must be given prominence in the DDRR processes with focus on outcomes and impact of interventions. Resources need to be allocated for this purpose to ensure that the processes are achieving their strategic objectives. Data collected for this purpose must be used to inform programming and the information shared with key stakeholders in a timely and accurate manner. Periodic evaluation by independent experts is essential to ensure that the programmes are on track and, where necessary, adjusted to demonstrate impact.

The political will to implement the DDRR Framework is crucial to its success. Resources need to be allocated for the effective and efficient implementation of the processes and where funding gaps exist, the international community should be approached for assistance. The failure to demonstrate political will to achieve this process will hinder stabilization and ultimately lead to a reoccurrence of violent extremism. The Federal, State and Local Governments


must also be committed to addressing the root causes of violent extremism to provide an enabling environment for the DDRR processes to function effectively. The failure to address long standing grievances and structural inequalities that perpetuate human rights violations would only lead to instability and a proliferation of violent extremist groups. Institutional reform and the promotion of rule of law that ensures there is equity and justice for all could demonstrate the political will to address the multi-dimensional nature of violent extremism.

Effective coordination of the various state and non-state actors in the implementation of the DDRR programme, by the National Security Adviser's Office, is integral to the success of the process. This would reduce duplication and ensure there is optimum utilization of funds. Effective coordination mechanisms that promote transparency and accountability are essential in promoting public confidence and ownership of the process. Communication is an effective management tool that should be used at every stage of the DDRR process to ensure that stakeholders are kept informed of the progress of the programme. Communication with target groups and ensuring that their views are incorporated into the design, monitoring and implementation of the process is important. Top-down approaches in these programmes reduce community buy-ins and hinder sustainability of initiatives. There must be communication strategies developed to support this process and key stakeholders given the responsibility of ensuring there is effective communication throughout the process to ensure legitimacy within communities, who in turn take ownership of the process.

Part Three

POLICY BRIEF
ON THE NATIONAL
FRAMEWORK AND
IMPLEMENTATION
STRATEGY ON

**DEMOBILISATION,
DERADICALISATION,
REHABILITATION AND
REINTEGRATION**





BACKGROUND

The conflict that has ravaged northeastern Nigeria since 2009 has left grave and complex humanitarian consequences. In 2015, the main perpetrators of the violent conflict, *Jama'atu Ahl-Sunnati Lil Da'awati Wal Jihad* (Boko Haram sect), became the deadliest extremist group in the world, surpassing the Islamic State, al-Qa`ida, and al-Shabaab.¹ After almost a decade since Boko Haram had its first major altercation with Nigerian security forces, the conflict has taken roots in the Lake Chad Basin, spreading to three neighbouring countries - Chad, Niger, and Northern Cameroon. It has since led over ten (10) million people vulnerable and in need of humanitarian assistance.²

Nigeria remains the hardest hit country with millions of people displaced from their homes and tens of thousands killed. At present, Nigeria has about 1.7 million internally displaced persons and 450,000 severely malnourished children.³ Millions more remain vulnerable. By conservative estimates, 35,000 persons were killed in the course of this conflict between 2011 and 2016.⁴

NATIONAL RESPONSE: MULTIPLE INITIATIVES

The Nigerian government has responded to the crises with multiple policy and cross-national initiatives for the purposes of preventing and countering violent extremism (PCVE). The military initiatives include: Operation Restore Order (Joint Task Force), the reviewed Multinational Joint Task Force (MNJTF) and the revamped Civilian Joint Task

Force (CJTF). To complement the hard approaches, the federal government has also established two main initiatives: the European-Union-supported Nigeria Prison De-radicalization Programme and Operation Safe Corridor (OPSC) in 2015. More recently, the government has launched special committees that support both federal and state-level programmes, including: the North East Marshall Plan (NEMAP), Presidential Committee on the North East Initiative (PCNI), North East Rehabilitation (NER), Presidential Initiative for the North East (PINE), Northeast Regional Initiative (NERI), and Victims Support Fund (VSF). At the legislative level, both chambers passed the North-East Development Commission (NEDC) bill in 2017. The NEDC is expected to supervise the physical reconstruction of conflict-torn communities in the northeast.

Altogether, these initiatives uniquely contribute to the overarching PCVE effort. Sorely lacking, however, is a synergy and an identifiable thread that ties the programmes together to feed the federal government's PCVE agenda. Multiplied efforts across the different initiatives have inadvertently resulted in inefficiencies and insufficient or stretched resources, which have rendered programmes ineffective

In response to this, The Kukah Centre (TKC) with support from NERI, selected a team of experts to review existing national instruments on countering violent extremism. Specifically, the expert consultants examined key national frameworks on Rehabilitation and Reintegration of perpetrators and victims of terrorism. The objective is to

¹ This is in terms of number of persons killed by the groups within a calendar. For more, see: Jason Warner and Matfess, Hilary. (2017) *Exploding Stereotypes: The Unexpected Operational and Demographic Characteristics of Boko Haram's Suicide Bombers*. Combating Terrorism Center Report (August), Military Academy West Point, N.Y., p. 1.

² United Nations Office for the Coordination of Humanitarian Affairs. (2017). *Lake Chad Basin: Crisis Update* (No. 16), p. 3.

³ Ibid.

⁴ Warner and Matfess (2017), p. 1.

produce a National Framework on Demobilization, Deradicalization, Rehabilitation and Reintegration (DDRR), and an accompanying implementation strategy. These vital documents will serve as primary tools to be used by The Kukah Centre for high-level strategic advocacy with stakeholders at the federal and state government levels. To head this strategic advocacy project is Bishop Matthew Hassan Kukah, the Founder of The Kukah Centre. This policy brief summarizes the National DDRR framework and its implementation strategy.

DDRR NATIONAL FRAMEWORK AND IMPLEMENTATION STRATEGY: KEY SHORTFALLS

Nigeria's PCVE agenda, as directed by the Office of the National Security Adviser (ONSA), complements the military initiatives of the government and envisages a multi-layered soft intervention that covers all aspects of DDRR and community engagement. TKC has found that this ambitious plan, ideally designed for a post-conflict context, is not being implemented as conceived. Again, there remains a considerable neglect of community perspectives, concerns and needs as part of policy measures aimed at promoting peaceful transition. There is also the concern that the current government project on rehabilitation and reinsertion of Boko Haram members neglects victims, and does not take cognizance of local initiatives and contributions. Importantly, significant efforts utilised at ending the conflict appear to have created parallel structures in affected communities, downplaying the role of traditional institutions, community and religious leadership, and denying local groups the opportunity to contribute to peace building processes. The failure to listen to the voices of victims and affected communities in supporting peace processes is likely to have adverse effects in implementing any DDRR National Framework.

In order for the government to execute an effective DDRR strategy, it is important that DDRR is treated as a continuum in which prior phases/programmes feed the next. Given this context therefore, DDRR should be viewed as a long-term process that begins with demobilization and ends with reintegration and social cohesion. In this light, The Kukah Center proposes a DDRR National Framework and an Implementation Strategy with the following key points.

DEMobilization:

* Demobilization aims to return armed groups back to civilian status. In this instance, it must be extended to cover all armed groups in the conflict areas, including Violent Extremism Offenders (VEOs) and CJTF. In its current form, demobilization is overwhelmingly militarized. In order to achieve greater impact and success, however, demobilization requires integral multi-agency cooperation. Existing initiatives like the

Prison Deradicalization and OPSC will be strengthened if the combined competencies of other Ministries, Departments, and Agencies (MDAs) like Ministries of Health and Women, Youth and Social Welfare, among others are maximized.

* The implementation of demobilization interventions must start with an efficient screening process. The current entryway into OPSC via OLD is not transparent. The screening process should be well defined and should, ideally, be conducted by vetted specialists or appropriate staff of relevant MDAs. Other aspects of this intervention should incorporate community structures and relevant MDAs.

Deradicalization:

* Deradicalization aims to facilitate behavior change and a denunciation of violence. Even with no clear legal framework, custodial deradicalization is a key component of the legal justice system with regards to VEOs. Consequently, the EU-supported project in Kuje prison is over-stretched. OPSC also conducts a form of deradicalization within the context of its limited resources. It need not be overemphasized that the national deradicalization project is grossly inadequate, lacking in physical infrastructure and human resources. In addition, although primarily designed for VEOs, members of the CJTF would benefit from the intervention and should be screened accordingly.

* The behavior management plans (BMP) required to ensure a behavior change in VEOs requires specialized skillsets. Given the volume of VEOs that are passing through the legal justice system, a long-term plan to train and equip requisite professionals, including personnel of the National Identity Management Commission (NIMC) and Nigerian Prisons Commission (NPC), is urgently required. Additionally, although the current deradicalization programs of the Prison Deradicalization project and OPSC are custodial, OPSC lacks legal back up. Thus, a legal framework that supports OPSC should be established and avenues for community-based deradicalization should be explored.

REHABILITATION:

* Rehabilitation involves social and economic interventions as a first step towards return to local communities. Unlike other interventions in the DDRR process, rehabilitation covers a wider range of target groups, including: IDPs, host communities, VEOs, CJTFs, and other groups with special needs. Given this variation, needs differ and should be treated accordingly. In addition, rehabilitation interventions require programmes which exceed the skill sets of NPS and other security personnel. This calls for multi-agency cooperation as well as support from the

communities, civil society, local and international organizations and the private sector.

- * Whilst economic rehabilitation mostly focuses on imparting skillsets for survival upon release into the communities, custodial-based rehabilitation entails preparation for rebuilding the communities. For a community-based rehabilitation programme, social rehabilitation encompasses a wide range of social needs, including transitional justice. It is important that rehabilitation programmes are needs-based. In addition, DDRR programmes should encourage community participation to seek alternative justice mechanisms to facilitate conflict resolution.

Reintegration:

- * Like Rehabilitation, reintegration has a wide range of target groups, including IDPs, host communities, VEOs, and CJTF members. Both custodial DDRR programs envisage reintegration into communities as the culmination of the process. Both programs also make provisions for pre-release assessment and post-release support even though there is rampant lack of material and human resources across all DDRR interventions. More than others, reintegration requires the full cooperation of families and communities as a prerequisite. This provides an opportunity to obtain community buy in and to let local communities take ownership of a vital aspect of the PCVE agenda.
- * Although it comes at the end of the DDRR process, reintegration should be seen as a long-term project that only begins when a person has been returned to a designated community. A monitoring mechanism must ensure the on-going well-being of such a person as well as that of the host community. Reintegration of special groups requires particular attention. In the case of unaccompanied children, existing social structures should be explored to affix them in family units. That failing, alternative care arrangements, such as orphanages, may be made. In the case of women, reintegration must take care to ensure that women who have been associated with the Boko Haram sect (for instance by forced marriages) do not suffer debilitating stigmatization. DDRR programmes must work with communities to create conducive spaces for traumatized women to thrive.

Recommendations: Existing Gaps and Opportunities for Action

The Center proposes a DDRR National Framework and an Implementation Strategy that must place adequate emphases on the following shortfalls. These recommendations are addressed to three key audiences: the Presidency, the Legislature, the International Community and State/Local Government executives.

The Presidency

Create Inter-Agency Cooperation: As the coordinating agency, ONSA should identify key MDAs and the various roles they can play in creating a more effective PCVE process. This will entail harmonizing existing functions, reassigning functions to more suitable MDAs or actors, and setting up a monitoring and feedback mechanism to ensure smooth workflow.

Ensure Adequate Material and Human Resources for DDRR Process: Existing DDRR facilities are poorly resourced. This refers to both human capacity and physical infrastructures. Proper funding of all phases of the DDRR strategy must be ensured by committing resources annually to the National Security Adviser's office specifically for this purpose. The over dependence on donor funding is detrimental to the long term stability of the country. There must be a national ownership of the DDRR process and this should be clearly demonstrated through providing adequate resources and instituting mechanisms that ensure that funds are used for the purposes they are intended for.

Address Special Needs Groups: The existing DDRR structure, especially demobilization and deradicalization, are overwhelmingly structured to cater to the needs of adult males. In general, special groups such as women, children, or persons living with disabilities are ignored. Programmes also largely fail to accommodate the needs of persons living with drug-induced mental conditions. The DDRR strategy must take care to delineate women and children associated with armed groups from those who are victims of the conflict. Women or children who are found to be associated (voluntarily or forced) with armed groups (including the CJTF) should be assigned to the appropriate programmes.

Mainstream Community Engagement: One of the main failures of the existing DDRR programme is the top-down structure that fails to harness the benefits of strong family and community structures. Community Engagement is based on the recognition of the centrality of communities in the entry into and disengagement from violent extremism. Community voices should be incorporated into the conceptualization and implementation of DDRR interventions.

Design Context-Driven DDRR Initiatives: Conflict communities and victims have been affected differently. Therefore, programmes to mitigate these crises should be contextualized. All DDRR interventions must be needs-based and evidence driven. Economic interventions, including skill trainings and financial aid programmes, must take into consideration pre-conflict realities and encourage existing economic structures.

Monitoring and Evaluation: The DDRR process needs to have a programmatic framework which incorporates an overarching monitoring and evaluation framework that tracks outcomes of the various interventions. This would help highlight the lessons learned that can be used to

strengthen the processes. The DDRR process is relatively new in Nigeria and it is important that an M&E system is developed early in the process to provide space for modification of the programme when the need arises.

Create Avenues for Transitional Justice: Although DDRR programmes do not have intrinsic legal justice components, the processes of reintegration should be preceded by judicial processes that smoothen re-entry into communities, especially in cases of VEOs. DDRR programmes must, therefore, address the need for transitional justice. This should make provisions for both criminal prosecution and restorative justice approaches, with the latter incorporating traditional legal systems, as best suited to each conflict community.

Review National Security Architecture: Asymmetric conflicts require innovative systems of security provision, particularly in communities that are regarded as hotspots within the country. The integration of non-state security actors into the Architecture would promote community policing and contribute to conflict prevention and mitigation. The security agencies are currently overstretched, and as conflicts continue to evolve and mutate, community driven solutions to insecurity must be prioritized to effectively manage the security situation in a sustainable way. This could be part of a broader Security Sector Reform in the country. Building the capacity of non-state security actors in up-to-date securitization mechanisms would help address the current security gaps.

The Legislature

Enhance Legal Imperative for DDRR: DDRR interventions lack solid legal backing at the moment. The Terrorism Prevention (Amendment) Act 2013 has no provision for core components of the nation's PCVE agenda. In addition, government initiatives like the EU-backed Prison Deradicalization and OPSC rely on older legislations such as the Prisons Act. The TPA should be amended to comprehensively support the PCVE agenda.

Create a budget to fund DDRR Process: The DDRR process suffer from a lack of adequate funding, which is reflected in the inadequate material and human resources across the various phases of individual interventions. The legislature should work with the Ministry of Finance, or the Budget Office, to address this need.

For the International Community

Technical Assistance: International development partners remain critical stakeholders in the DDRR processes. They provide technical assistance to government institutions and CSOs as well as a significant amount of funding as a part of their commitment to the promotion of stability in Nigeria.

Programme Coordination: The coordination of programmes within DDRR remains a significant challenge and this has led to wastage of resources through duplication of efforts. It is therefore important that the international community strengthens collaboration among donors to ensure that information is shared and programmes are complementary.

Establish Partnership: It is also important that donor programmes design exit strategies that promote sustainability through building synergies with the different levels of government, relevant institutions, CSOs and communities. It is important that there is local ownership for sustainability.

State/Local Government Executive Leadership

Replicate Federal level programmes at the state level: State-led DDRR programmes should be developed to complement federal government's rebuilding efforts. Furthermore, these efforts will help local communities to take ownership of DDRR programmes, and further enhance federal programmes by contextualizing it to local needs.

Assist in Designing Context Specific Programmes: State and Local Governments need to create context specific programmes to prevent violent extremism in the communities. This needs to be a part of their annual state budgets to ensure that the gains from the programmes implemented by the Federal Government, CSOs and international development partners are sustained for long-term stability.

CONCLUSION

The DDRR framework is derived from the overarching PCVE agenda. As a sweeping policy, it has the potential to adequately address the dire humanitarian crisis in Nigeria's Northeast that has left about 8.5million Nigerians in need of one form of humanitarian assistance or the other. This policy brief advocates for a unification of the various government initiatives to enable a unification of purpose in tackling the crisis. It also calls for an alteration to the less than adequate elements of these initiatives.

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THE KUKAH CENTRE

The Centre was established by Bishop Kukah to enhance and encourage greater citizen engagement in Nigeria, The Kukah Centre is a nonprofit organization that promotes an active and engaged citizenry by providing support for inclusive dialogue and advocacy initiatives.

The Centre treats political leadership as a collaborative exercise and aims to promote governance structures which incorporate multiple levels of engagement, including individuals, households, small businesses, the private sector, NGOs and government.

Interfaith dialogue is at the core of the Centre's work and involves actively promoting conversations among Nigeria's faith communities, as well as between leaders in faith and public policy.

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