



OSUN STATE SECURITY REPORT

**Election Security Intelligence Brief Ahead of the
15 August 2026 Osun State Governorship Election**

**Prepared by
The Kukah Centre**

EXECUTIVE SUMMARY AND OVERALL RISK JUDGEMENT

Osun enters the final month before the governorship election with a High security risk that is increasingly concentrated around politically important places and phases of the process. The principal threat is not indiscriminate violence across all 30 LGAs. There is a possibility that a limited number of targeted incidents in Osogbo, Irewole, and other hotspot LGAs will suppress participation, disrupt the movement of election materials, provoke retaliatory mobilisation, or cast doubt on the credibility of collation and result declaration.


The timing of the violence matters. Twenty-one of the 44 ERV incidents occurred in May and June 2026, and June alone recorded 15 incidents. The pattern also changed: late-2025 incidents were largely isolated killings, cult clashes and criminal attacks, whereas May–June added primary-election violence, attacks on party leaders and offices, multi-location shootings, political abductions and violence around local-government institutions. The operational environment is therefore becoming more coordinated at the same time that campaign activity, election logistics and result management are converging.

What this means for the election

- Voter participation is most vulnerable in hotspot communities where fear of thuggery, cult reprisals or political shootings may discourage early arrival, prolonged queueing or return to polling units after temporary disruption.
- INEC logistics are exposed where political or criminal actors can obstruct transport routes, create false reports of insecurity or exploit delays to allege manipulation.
- Collation is the highest-risk phase because it concentrates party agents, officials, security personnel and disputed expectations at the moment when political stakes are greatest.
- The unresolved local-government dispute gives political actors an existing institutional grievance, a network of contested public facilities and a recent history of lethal confrontation that can be reactivated by election-day disputes.
- The absence of a completed prosecution in the current-cycle cases reviewed weakens deterrence and may encourage actors to treat intimidation or violence as a low-cost political instrument.

OVERALL JUDGEMENT


The election can still be conducted peacefully. However, success now depends on front-loaded and visibly neutral security deployment, protected logistics and collation facilities, rapid factual communication, and credible follow-through on arrests and prosecutions.



1. STATEWIDE RISK PROFILE: CONCENTRATED RATHER THAN UNIFORM


Ahead of the upcoming gubernatorial election in Osun State, with political parties, electoral stakeholders and security agencies intensifying preparations for the polls, the security landscape requires continued assessment to support a peaceful and credible electoral process. While the state generally maintains a stable security outlook, the assessment identifies localised risk factors that may influence the electoral environment if left unaddressed. Of the 30 LGAs in the state, two LGAs (Osogbo and Irewole) are assessed as critical risk, four LGAs (Boripe, Iwo, Ilesha West and Obokun) as high risk, and nine LGAs as exhibiting emerging risk indicators requiring close monitoring. These findings are underpinned by four interrelated dynamics.

- i. Recurrent organised political violence linked to party-aligned thugs and youth groups;
- ii. The unresolved dispute over control of LGA secretariats, which continues to heighten tensions;
- iii. Criminal actors exploiting the political environment for targeted attacks and intimidation; and
- iv. An increasingly active ecosystem of misinformation, disinformation and hate speech capable of triggering panic and reprisals.




Political violence/thuggery accounts for the largest recorded share at 46.9%, followed by political intimidation and Inter/intra party conflicts at 12.7% each. Fake news accounts for 10.1%. INEC interference or undermining of the electoral body accounts for 6.3%. Political assassination and plots to rig elections each account for 5.1%.

DISTRIBUTION OF VIOLENCE BY TYPE IN OSUN STATE (June 2025 - June 2026)



Cult-related violence accounts for the single largest recorded category, with 25% of incidents recorded in the dataset. Political violence and thuggery, recorded as a joint category, account for 13.7% of incidents. Kidnapping accounts for 13.6%. Killing/gunmen attacks accounted for 9.1% of incidents. Eleven further categories, comprising of mob attack, security agency misconduct, police brutality, ritual killing, civil unrest, misuse of force, extra-judicial killings, physical assault, assassination attempt, assassination and targeted attack, and political assassination attempt, are each recorded once, together accounting for approximately 38.6% of the total when combined.


Risk Map of Osun State (June 2025 - June 2026)



Thirteen of Osun's thirty LGAs, fewer than half the state, account for the overwhelming majority of recorded violence and are rated Critical or High. Osogbo is Critical because it combines the highest incident concentration with the state's administrative, media and electoral command functions. Party headquarters, government institutions, INEC facilities, major transport nodes and the state collation process are all located in the capital. For instance, Osogbo recorded attacks on party leaderships of APC and Accord and campaign facilities; Irewole is Critical for a different reason. The LGA carries the memory of the February 2025 secretariat violence and has since recorded targeted and cult-related incidents. Existing grievances mean that even a comparatively small trigger (an arrest, disputed access to a public facility, a campaign clash or an allegation of biased enforcement) could generate retaliation more quickly than in an LGA without the same casualty history.

Critical	Osogbo; Irewole
High	Boripe; Obokun; Ilesa West; Ife Central; Ife North; Iwo; Ede North; Ifedayo; Ilesa East; Isokan; Irepodun
Moderate	Ola-Oluwa; Ife East; Ifelodun; Oriade; Egbedore; Ila
Low	Orolu; Atakunmosa East; Atakunmosa West; Ayedaade; Ayedire; Boluwaduro; Ede South; Ejigbo; Ife South; Odo-Otin; Olorunda
ELECTION IMPLICATION	Low and Moderate ratings should not be read as “no risk.” They indicate lower recorded pressure, but election-day incidents can migrate through transport routes, party mobilisation and online narratives. Critical and High-risk LGAs require stronger deployment; all LGAs still require baseline protection and rapid response.

2. ESCALATION TRAJECTORY: FROM ISOLATED ATTACKS TO A JUNE CLUSTER




The timeline shows more than an increase in incident volume. It shows an evolution in capability and intent. The late-2025 killings of transport-union figures demonstrated selective targeting. By May and June 2026, the pattern had expanded to include an attack on a party chairman, violence at an intra-party primary, coordinated shootings across several Osogbo neighbourhoods, attacks on political premises, renewed attempts to control council secretariats and violence near a contested public facility. For instance, on 31 May, violence at an Accord primary in Iwo reportedly caused mass injuries and a later death. On 3-4 June, Asimiyu Ajibola was shot in Osogbo. On 9-10 June, armed incidents were reported across Osogbo neighbourhoods and around the ADC campaign headquarters. The month then closed with the killings of Ezekiel Olapade in Irepodun and Ajayi Aderogba in Obokun.

This shift affects the election in three ways. First, it raises the probability of sequential incidents: an attack in one location can trigger mobilisation, counter-accusations and copycat actions elsewhere. Second, it increases the value of operational coordination because single-LGA deployments may be bypassed by actors moving across neighbouring communities. Lastly, it shortens the time available for prevention. Security arrangements designed around the 13-month average would understate the pace visible in June, which should be treated as the relevant operational baseline for the final month.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

Security agencies should pre-position mobile reserves before major rallies, material distribution and collation, not wait for the final week. Candidate movements, party offices, transport parks and campaign routes require protective planning because the recent pattern shows that political targets and surrounding civilians can be affected by the same incident.

3. TWO EXPRESSIONS OF THE SAME ELECTORAL PRESSURE



The two monitoring streams reveal how coercion operates at different levels. ERV records the visible physical cost—killings, injuries, kidnappings and attacks. EOTS records the political tactics that shape the contest before or around violence—intimidation, thuggery, threats, destruction of campaign materials, attacks on the credibility of INEC, and misinformation. The common signal is that political competition is increasingly being pursued through pressure on people, institutions and information, not only through formal campaigning. For instance, the shooting of the Osogbo Accord chairman directly threatened party leadership and campaign organisation. By contrast, the false claim that INEC registered underage voters in Ede North attacked confidence in the voter register, while a June school-kidnapping rumour caused panic and school closures despite official confirmation that no abduction had occurred.


The practical consequence is that a reduction in fatalities would not by itself mean the election environment has improved. Voters can be deterred without an attack if armed groups are visible near a polling area, party agents are threatened, campaign offices are vandalised, or false claims persuade communities that voting has been cancelled or results have already been manipulated. These tactics are cheaper, harder to attribute and capable of producing the same electoral outcome as physical violence: reduced turnout, unequal participation or rejection of the result.

Osun’s 2022 election provides an important benchmark. Observers described the poll as generally peaceful and commended early deployment and rapid publication of polling-unit results. That performance raised public expectations. In 2026, delays or inconsistent communication will therefore be judged against a recent experience of efficient administration and may be interpreted as deliberate manipulation rather than routine operational difficulty.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

Election security must protect both the physical process and the credibility of the process. A joint incident room should track violence, intimidation, logistics problems and false information as parts of one escalation picture, with verified public updates issued before political actors fill the information gap.

4. SECURITY-SECTOR CONDUCT: A SMALL SHARE WITH SYSTEM-WIDE EFFECTS



Security-sector-related incidents account for 11.4% of ERV records, but their electoral effect is larger than the percentage suggests. The same institutions implicated in misconduct allegations are expected to control crowds, protect ballot materials, enforce movement restrictions, investigate political attacks and secure collation centres. Where their neutrality is doubted, routine actions (searches, arrests, dispersal orders or deployment decisions) can be interpreted as partisan interventions.

The directly recorded cases span Oriade, Osogbo and Ife North, while the political debate about police neutrality has become statewide. For instance, In Akinlalu, Ife North, a confrontation involving Amotekun personnel produced multiple deaths and led to police arrests. In March 2026, two Customs officers were arrested after a driver was killed during a chase in Osogbo. In Osogbo, an anti-robbery officer was investigated after allegedly attacking a lounge owner.

This creates a compliance problem. Party supporters who expect biased treatment are more likely to arrive with their own protection, resist police instructions or mobilise crowds after an arrest. Voters may also avoid polling units where security personnel are perceived as aligned with one side. The result is a paradox: heavier deployment can reduce violence only if the deployment is trusted; otherwise, it may increase tension.

The required response is visible neutrality. Mixed deployments, clear command structures, consistent enforcement across parties and rapid investigation of alleged misconduct are not public-relations measures; they are conflict-prevention tools. Public disclosure of who was arrested, the legal basis for action and the status of investigations would reduce the rumour space that turns security operations into political narratives.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

The credibility of the security operation will influence whether parties accept restrictions and whether voters feel safe enough to participate. Neutrality must be demonstrated through conduct, documentation and communication, not asserted after a disputed incident.

5. CULTISM: THE LARGEST ERV CATEGORY AND AN ELECTION RISK MULTIPLIER

TIMELINE OF KEY CULTISM INCIDENTS IN OSUN STATE

											
11 September 2025	2 October 2025	17 November 2025	18 Jan 2026	24 March 2025	31 March 2026	26 May 2026	26 May 2026	5 Jun 2026	15 June 2026	16 June 2026	17 June 2026
Boripe - Iree	Obokun - Esa-Oke	Ife Central - Ile-Ife	Osogbo - Orita Eledele	Ilesa West - Adeti Area	Obokun - Esa Oke	Ede North - Ede Township	Ede North - Ede Township	Irewole - Ikire Township	Osogbo - Sabo area	Ilesa East - Ogudu	Iyemogun, Ilesa
Two students injured in campus cult clash, police arrest six.	Graduate killed by stray bullet	Suspected cultists/clash claims four lives, police recover two corpses.	Two students injured in campus cult clash, police arrest six.	Shooting linked to cult violence	Another person killed in village, reports suggest cultism.	Cult clash between Aye (NBM) and Buccaneers (BAN) near Federal Polytechnic, Ede	Buccaneers (BAN) killed an Aye (NBM) cultist in retaliation.	Multiple cultist attack reported in Ikire	Cultist killed in Sabo area	3 cultists killed on "cult day".	Cult group killed a man near a secretariat.
2 Injured	2 Dead	4 Dead	1 Dead			2 Dead	1 Dead	1 Dead	1 Dead	3 Dead	1 Dead

Election Security Information Hub

Cultism represents the most significant security threat in Osun State, while available data shows no apparent correlation between this threat and electoral risks. This situation is particularly concerning due to the presence of operative thugs who can be mobilized to disrupt the electoral process. They pose risks such as voter intimidation and aggression towards security personnel and INEC officials on election day. By mapping their activities, we can effectively assess and identify hot spots of vulnerability, allowing for proactive risk mitigation ahead of the elections.

Cultism accounts for 12 of 44 ERV incidents, or 27.3%, making it the largest single threat category. The incidents are distributed across Boripe, Obokun, Ife Central, Osogbo, Ilesa West, Ede North, Irewole and Ilesa East, with six occurring in May and June. At Osun State Polytechnic, Iree, two students were injured during a gunfight and six suspects were arrested in September 2025. In November, a suspected cult clash in Ife Central reportedly caused four deaths. In late May 2026, two undergraduates were killed in Ede, while further cult incidents were recorded in Irewole in June.

Even where a specific incident arises from confraternity rivalry rather than party competition, it still changes the election environment by increasing the availability of violent networks, normalising weapon carrying, generating retaliation and creating neighbourhoods in which young people can be rapidly mobilised.

The electoral risk is therefore functional rather than purely ideological. Cult groups do not need to be formally controlled by a party to affect voting. Their presence can determine who controls streets and transport nodes, whether party agents can enter a community, whether voters remain at polling units after violence is rumoured, and whether post-result celebrations become confrontational. The concentration of cult incidents in several High-risk LGAs means that criminal rivalry and electoral mobilisation may reinforce each other during the final campaign period.


A broad crackdown that treats all youths as political thugs could be counterproductive. The more effective approach is targeted intelligence: identify known conflict networks, monitor retaliatory cycles, restrict weapon movement, engage community leaders and transport unions, and protect polling access routes in affected communities.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

Cult-related violence can suppress turnout and enable intimidation even without direct party instruction. Hotspot policing should focus on the networks and locations capable of controlling access to polling units, not only on formal campaign events.

6. ACTOR ATTRIBUTION: MULTI-ACTOR RISK AND THE DANGER OF PREMATURE BLAME

PERPETRATOR ASSESSMENT IN OSUN STATE



- APC (18 incidents): Involved in political offenses like inter-party conflicts and election manipulation, often based on allegations.
- Other/Unclear (13 incidents): Various individuals and groups in legal and electoral disputes.
- Unidentified Cultists (12 incidents): Linked to cult-related violence and attacks.
- PDP (11 incidents): Primarily noted for political disputes and internal issues, without confirmed violence.
- Unidentified Political Thugs (9 incidents): Associated with political violence and intimidation.
- Accord (7 incidents): Appears in political disputes, often as victims.
- Security Agents (5 incidents): Noted for misconduct, including police brutality.
- Unidentified Thugs/Hoodlums (5 incidents): Tied to public disorder and election violence.
- Kidnappers/Bandits (5 incidents): Focused on kidnapping with no political connections.
- Unidentified Gunmen/Assassins (4 incidents): Responsible for targeted attacks and political killings.
- Unnamed Political Parties (4 incidents): Involved in disputes without naming specific parties.
- Mob (4 incidents): Linked to collective violence and unrest.
- Armed Robbers (2 incidents): Primarily involved in armed robbery, no political motives.
- ADC (1 incident): Mentioned in one electoral dispute.
- SDP (1 incident): Appears once in electoral competition.

The incident record does not support a simple claim that one party is responsible for the violence. Accord-affiliated figures appear repeatedly as targets, including the Osogbo chairman, a party official's relative in Irewole and a rally organiser in Obokun; the party also experienced internal primary violence in Iwo. APC and PDP feature prominently as rival claimants in the local-government dispute. ADC appears as the target of an attack on a campaign office. Several killings and shootings remain attributed only to unidentified gunmen or hoodlums.


This ambiguity is itself an electoral risk. Where perpetrators are unidentified, parties and supporters fill the evidentiary gap with partisan explanations. Those claims travel faster than investigations and can trigger retaliatory mobilisation, especially when an incident occurs shortly before a rally or near a contested public facility. The attacks on transport-union figures also matter because unions influence mobility, crowd movement and access to vehicles, functions that become operationally important on election day.

Protective planning should therefore be even-handed and role-based. Security should cover candidates, party offices, agents, transport unions and campaign venues across parties. Public statements should distinguish a confirmed victim, an alleged affiliation and an identified perpetrator. Conflating those roles risks turning an unresolved crime into a statewide partisan confrontation.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

The absence of clear attribution makes impartial investigation and careful public language essential. Premature blame can mobilise supporters faster than facts can be established and can transform a local attack into a broader inter-party crisis.

7. ACCOUNTABILITY AND IMPUNITY: WHY CASE PROGRESSION MATTERS BEFORE POLLING



Sixteen current-cycle cases were reviewed against public updates. Ten produced a reported arrest or detention, four reached arraignment or remand, and no conviction was located for the current-cycle cases reviewed. This shows that law-enforcement action is possible, but that the accountability chain weakens as cases move from arrest to prosecution and final judgment. For instance, four suspects were arraigned over the killing of Irewole chairman Remi Abass. Suspects were remanded in the Ido-Ayegunle killings, the murder of an FRSC officer and her daughter, and the death of a mosque worshipper. A suspect was also arrested after the killing of Ezekiel Olapade. No public arrest was made for several high-profile cases, including the killings of Adeboye Ademoroti, Kolade Eluyera and Ajayi Aderogba.

The electoral effect is behavioural. When violent actors see arrests that do not progress visibly, the perceived cost of intimidation remains low. Victims and party supporters may also conclude that legal remedies are too slow and turn to self-protection or retaliation. Conversely, arbitrary or poorly explained arrests can be interpreted as partisan enforcement. Accountability therefore requires both pace and transparency: case updates, clear charges, court dates and equal treatment across political affiliations.

The four cases that reached court are especially important because they demonstrate a route from investigation to judicial scrutiny. Visible progress in those cases before election day would strengthen deterrence more credibly than broad promises of prosecution. Due process must remain intact, but institutional silence should not. Regular public status updates would show that political violence attracts consequences and reduces the pressure for communities or parties to seek their own justice.


ELECTION IMPLICATION

Impunity is not only a post-incident justice problem. It shapes pre-election incentives. A credible, transparent accountability process raises the expected cost of violence and reduces the attraction of thuggery as a campaign or result-contestation strategy.

8. LGA-BY-DRIVER DIAGNOSTIC MAPS: DIFFERENT DRIVERS REQUIRE DIFFERENT RESPONSES

LGA DISTRIBUTION OF KEY DRIVERS OF ELECTORAL RISK IN OSUN STATE


LGA Secretariat dispute




Organised Political Violence



Security Sector Conduct / Neutrality



Misinformation/Disinformation/Fake News



The maps show that the four drivers have different geographic reach. Organised political violence is directly evidenced in 12 LGAs across all three senatorial zones, creating several corridors of risk rather than one isolated hotspot. The local-government secretariat dispute has the widest footprint, affecting multiple LGAs. Security-sector conduct is directly recorded in Oriade, Osogbo and Ife North, while misinformation is directly mapped to Osogbo, Ede North, Ila, Ilesa West, Ifelodun, Boluwaduro, Odo Otin, and Olorunda but circulates statewide through digital networks.

The secretariat dispute is especially consequential because it turns public administrative facilities into contested political spaces. Several LGAs affected by the dispute also host Critical or High security risks. In the build up to the election, any attempt to occupy, secure or remove officials from a council facility could draw party supporters, security agencies and local employees into the same space. Where those facilities are close to logistics or collation routes, the dispute can spill directly into election administration.

The maps also demonstrate why a single deployment template would fail. Osogbo requires urban command-and-control, protection of INEC and party infrastructure, and information management. Irewole requires deterrence combined with mediation around an unresolved grievance. Other places like Ifedayo need route security against kidnapping. Ife North requires visible neutrality. Ilesa East and West require attention to cult networks, abductions and party-agent movements.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

Deployment should follow the dominant driver in each LGA. More personnel alone will not resolve an institutional dispute, counter misinformation or restore trust after alleged misconduct. Each hotspot requires a specific prevention package.

9. CRITICAL AND HIGH-RISK LGA PROFILES: HOW RISK MAY AFFECT THE VOTE


The table translates the risk tiers into likely effects on participation, logistics and result management. It is intended to guide where observers, security reserves and rapid communication capacity should be concentrated.

LGA	Risk context	Incident example	Election implication
Osogbo	State capital; concentration of party offices, government institutions, media and final result management.	Ajibola assassination attempt; June multi-neighbourhood shootings; campaign-office vandalism.	Any incident can disrupt urban movement, trigger statewide narratives and threaten collation or result acceptance.
Irewole	Unresolved secretariat grievance and history of lethal political confrontation.	Remi Abass killed at Ikire secretariat in February 2025; Kolade Eluyera killed in May 2026.	A small access dispute or rumour may trigger retaliatory mobilisation and deter voters from approaching public facilities.
Boripe	Cult activity and secretariat dispute overlap with politically active communities.	Two students injured in Iree cult clash; six suspects arrested.	Armed youth networks could intimidate voters or be drawn into political enforcement; campus-area polling needs focused patrols.
Obokun	Targeted killing risk and recent communal violence increase fear and revenge narratives.	Ajayi Aderogba, an Accord supporter, was killed in Esa-Oke shortly before a rally; Ido-Ayegunle violence caused multiple deaths.	Campaign events and polling may be affected by revenge mobilisation, protest gatherings and reduced movement between communities.
Ilesa West	Cult violence and political abduction allegations create a coercive environment.	A March cult shooting and a June report of abduction by suspected political thugs.	Threats against agents and supporters can suppress monitoring at polling units and result collation.
Ife Central	Dense urban mobilisation and recurring violent networks.	Four deaths in a suspected cult clash in November 2025; political thugs clashed in Sabo during a June campaign event.	Crowd management failures could spread rapidly across adjoining wards and interfere with polling or transport routes.
Ife North	Security-sector controversy and lethal armed confrontation.	Akinlalu confrontation with multiple deaths and Amotekun arrests; Customs driver killed on Osogbo–Iwo route.	Distrust of security actors may reduce compliance, while road incidents can affect logistics movement and observer access.
Iwo	Competitive intra-party and inter-party mobilisation; strategic urban centre in Osun West.	Violence at an Accord primary on 31 May reportedly caused widespread injuries and a subsequent death.	Unresolved primary grievances can reappear as polling-unit intimidation, agent disputes or post-result protest.
Ede North	Recent cult killings and political intimidation allegations in a high-mobilisation area.	Two undergraduates were killed in a suspected cult attack in May; a June incident involved alleged coercion of a party member.	Fear among young voters and party supporters may reduce turnout or encourage retaliatory mobilisation.
Ifedayo	Kidnapping and route-security risk in less accessible communities.	Ex-Customs officer abducted in December; two residents abducted in February; an LGA vice-chairman abducted in June.	Late movement of staff and materials becomes more vulnerable; security escorts and contingency routes are required.
Ilesa East	Targeted killings and thuggery within the wider Ilesa political corridor.	NURTW leader Adeboye Ademoroti was killed in November; two persons were reportedly abducted by thugs in June.	Transport-union networks and coercive actors can affect movement to polling units and access for party agents.
Isokan	Previous campaign-linked assault and secretariat-dispute exposure.	Residents were attacked during political activity in Apomu in October 2025.	Campaign grievances may translate into localised intimidation or attempts to dominate specific wards.
Irepodun	Secretariat confrontation, political thuggery and a recent fatality involving a minor.	Ezekiel Olapade was killed near the Irepodun secretariat in Ilobu; a suspect was later arrested.	The incident can drive fear, partisan blame and revenge mobilisation around polling and LGA collation facilities.

The pattern is not confined to one senatorial district. The western axis contains Irewole, Isokan, Iwo and Ede North; the central axis contains Osogbo, Boriye, Ifelodun and Irepodun; the eastern axis contains Obokun, Ilesa East, Ilesa West, Ife Central, Ife North and Ifedayo. This dispersion means that a security reserve positioned only in the capital may arrive too late to contain coordinated incidents elsewhere. Deployment should include zonal reserves with clear authority to reinforce neighbouring LGAs.

KEY JUDGEMENT	The same risk tier does not imply the same operational problem. Security planning should prioritise the specific election effect-turnout suppression, route disruption, crowd confrontation, biased-enforcement perception or post-result retaliation-identified for each LGA.
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10. ELECTION-DAY RISK TRANSITION: WHY POLLING AND COLLATION NOW MATTER MOST



Campaign violence remains high, but its relative importance will decline as the election moves into operational phases. Polling and collation risk rises toward Critical because the process will concentrate people, materials, authority and political expectations at fixed locations. The most credible threat is not a statewide armed confrontation; it is targeted interference at selected polling units, logistics nodes or collation centres that changes turnout, delays results or creates a narrative that the outcome was manipulated.

The 2018 rerun remains part of Osun's political memory, while the comparatively orderly 2022 election created expectations of timely deployment and transparent result publication. In 2026, any prolonged delay, disputed exclusion of agents, failure to communicate or heavy-handed crowd control at collation will be interpreted through both precedents. The political cost of an administrative mistake will therefore be higher than the technical error itself.

The operational focus should shift accordingly: protect Registration Area Centres before dawn; secure the movement of sensitive materials; deter intimidation at hotspot polling units; establish controlled access and layered security at ward and LGA collation centres; and prepare a verified communication response for delays, attacks and false result claims.

ELECTION IMPLICATION

Collation is the single highest-risk phase because it combines maximum political stakes with concentrated crowds and contested institutional authority. A disruption at one LGA collation centre can delay statewide declaration and create the conditions for protest or retaliation elsewhere.

11. PHASE-SPECIFIC RISK SCENARIOS AND ELECTORAL EFFECTS

Phase	Credible risk scenario	How it affects the election	Priority control
Opening and logistics	Late arrival of personnel or materials; obstruction of routes; false reports of attacks or missing materials.	Delayed opening reduces participation, especially among voters who cannot wait. Information gaps allow parties to frame routine delays as deliberate disenfranchisement.	Pre-position materials, secure routes, publish opening-time updates and deploy repair/replacement teams.
Polling	Visible thugs or cult-linked groups; threats to agents; selective disruption; disputes over accreditation.	Fear suppresses turnout and can produce unequal participation between strongholds. A short disruption can have lasting effect if voters leave and do not return.	Protect access routes, keep armed personnel outside immediate voting areas unless required, and use rapid reinforcement rather than mass crowding.
Close of poll and movement	Interception of materials; roadblocks; attacks on vehicles; crowd attempts to follow results.	Loss or delay of materials creates legal disputes and rumours of substitution. Personnel become vulnerable during predictable movement windows.	Use secure convoy plans, varied routes, GPS/radio contact and controlled handover at collation points.
Ward and LGA collation	Agent exclusion, procedural delay, conflicting figures, crowd mobilisation, allegations of security bias.	This is the phase most likely to convert local tension into a legitimacy crisis. Violence can halt collation, delay declaration and trigger statewide mobilisation.	Layer security, enforce accreditation, maintain written incident logs, communicate procedural decisions and keep mobile reserves outside the venue.
Result declaration and post-result	Premature result claims, protest mobilisation, attacks on party offices, retaliatory violence.	Even a credible result can be rejected if information disorder and unresolved grievances dominate the first hours after declaration.	Coordinate official results messaging, protect party and INEC facilities, engage peace actors and monitor reprisal indicators for 72 hours.

Early-warning triggers requiring immediate escalation

- Movement of armed or organised youth groups toward campaign venues, polling units, council secretariats or collation centres.
- Threats against candidates, party agents, election officials, transport providers or community leaders.
- Attempts by rival groups to occupy public facilities or prevent officials from entering them.
- Simultaneous reports of shootings, roadblocks or campaign-office attacks in more than one LGA.
- Viral claims of attacks, cancelled voting, missing materials or fabricated results that are not confirmed by INEC or security authorities.
- Public allegations of selective arrest or security bias following a politically sensitive incident.

ESCALATION RULE

When two or more triggers occur in the same LGA or across neighbouring LGAs, activate joint command review, deploy a mobile reserve and issue a verified public update before the narrative hardens.

12. OPERATIONAL PRIORITIES FOR A PEACEFUL AND CREDIBLE ELECTION

The evidence supports a prevention sequence built around the likely effect on the election: stop mobilisation before it reaches election facilities; secure the logistics and collation chain; communicate verified information quickly; contain incidents without partisan appearance; document enforcement; and manage the 72-hour post-result period.

Stakeholder	Priority action	Why it matters for the election
Security agencies	Pre-position mobile reserves in Critical and High-risk LGAs; secure RACs, transport routes and collation centres; use mixed teams and publish rapid factual incident updates.	Reduces response time, limits accusations of selective enforcement and prevents local incidents from becoming statewide narratives.
INEC	Protect the logistics chain, communicate delays immediately, enforce controlled access to collation venues and maintain one authoritative information channel.	Operational silence creates space for rumours, intimidation and premature result claims.
Political parties	Enforce the Peace Accord internally; prohibit thugs and cult-linked mobilisation; protect agents through lawful channels; restrain supporters after results.	Party-level discipline is the fastest way to reduce crowd mobilisation and retaliatory violence.
Media	Verify before publication, distinguish allegation from fact, avoid premature result calls and correct false information visibly.	Information disorder can suppress turnout or trigger confrontation without a physical attack.
Observers/civil society	Prioritise the mapped LGAs and facilities for deployment; preserve exact time, place, actor role and response data; escalate verified incidents quickly.	High-quality incident reporting improves targeting, accountability and post-election dispute resolution.
Community leaders	Activate local de-escalation networks, discourage revenge mobilisation and support safe access for vulnerable voters.	Trusted local voices can contain rumours and prevent youth mobilisation before security reinforcements arrive.

Priority sequence

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Prevent mobilisation → secure election infrastructure → communicate verified information → contain incidents quickly → preserve neutral, documented enforcement → manage post-result tensions.

Final risk judgement

Osun's election security challenge is serious but containable. The principal danger is that localised incidents at politically important places will have effects far beyond their immediate location: suppressing turnout, delaying logistics, interrupting collation or convincing one side that the result was produced through force or institutional bias. The state does not require an indiscriminate security surge. It requires differentiated protection of the LGAs, facilities and phases identified in this report, backed by credible communication and visible accountability.